The purpose of this project is to examine if contracts where public transport operators as a part of their compensation receive ticket revenues (so called net contracts) give the operators stronger incentives to achieve the public transport authorities objectives´. The alternativ is gross contracts where operators hand over ticket revenues to the public transport authority and are compensated for the full cost of the operation. Our survey of public transport authorities´ objectives suggests that the most frequent objectives were to increase patronage, to achieve accessibility to schools and for travel opportunities for disabled persons. We also found that the most frequent contract form is gross contracts and that these are often enhanced with ticket revenue incentives. We compared bus transport in 18 mid-sized Swedish towns with data from 1997-2005. For several of the authorities data were not available for several of these years. We found that in towns with net contracts prices were on average higher than in towns with gross contracts. In towns with net contracts the number of journeys were smaller than in towns with gross contracts. Both costs and subsidies were lower in towns with net contracts than in towns with gross contracts. The users were more satisfied measured by the Kollektivtrafikbarometern in towns with net cost contracts. Therefore net cost contracts do not unequivocally give stronger incentives to achieving public transport authority objectives. A reservation is that we have too few observations from years before a point in time where a contract change has taken place to be able to say anything about what happens when changing from gross to net contract or vice versa. Therefore the differences may be the result of other differences between the towns.