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Nyström, Johan
Publications (10 of 35) Show all publications
Nyström, J. (2019). Barriers for Innovation in Road Construction: A Technical Consultant's Perspective. In: IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science. Paper presented at 13th International Scientific Conference on People, Buildings and Environment, PBE 2018, 17 October 2018 through 19 October 2018. Institute of Physics Publishing (1)
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Barriers for Innovation in Road Construction: A Technical Consultant's Perspective
2019 (English)In: IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, Institute of Physics Publishing , 2019, no 1Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Technical consultants develop visions into buildable designs. Despite having a large impact on a construction project, there is a lack of research into the consultant's potential contribution to innovations. The main measure to stimulate innovation in the construction sector is providing contractor with degrees of freedom through design-build contracting. This contracting form is not new, but there are still problems with the sector productivity. Consultants enter construction projects in the planning stage and set the framework for what the contactors, in the following phase, can build. This paper aims at identifying the consultants' incentives for innovations in road construction. Four barriers for consultants to preserve degrees of freedom in the planning process have been identified: the legislation, strive for concretion, fixed prices payment schemes and monetary bonuses on finishing the road plan obstruct innovation. Removing such barriers can both improve productivity and contribute to a more sustainable construction market.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Physics Publishing, 2019
Keywords
Road construction, Contractor, Design (overall design), Stimulation, Incentive (reward)
National Category
Construction Management
Research subject
00 Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, 01 Road: Organization and administration; 00 Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, 02 Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-13692 (URN)10.1088/1755-1315/222/1/012005 (DOI)2-s2.0-85062494158 (Scopus ID)
Conference
13th International Scientific Conference on People, Buildings and Environment, PBE 2018, 17 October 2018 through 19 October 2018
Available from: 2019-05-09 Created: 2019-05-09 Last updated: 2019-08-09Bibliographically approved
Nyström, J., Nilsson, J.-E. & Börjesson, M. (2019). Delay Fees in the Procurement of Construction Projects. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 53, 348-363
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Delay Fees in the Procurement of Construction Projects
2019 (English)In: Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, ISSN 0022-5258, E-ISSN 1754-5951, Vol. 53, p. 348-363Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper suggests Delay Fees (DF) to handle temporary congestion during road works. The DF is paid by the contractor based on road users' loss of travel time due to construction. This decentralises the trade-off between construction costs and user time to the contractor, increasing social welfare. The contractor not only will account for user time during each single project, but also is incentivised to develop innovative construction techniques. Compared to other means in the literature for reducing temporary construction, the DF is more general in its focus on user time rather than lane closure.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
UNIV BATH, 2019
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-14269 (URN)000489040900004 ()
Available from: 2019-11-04 Created: 2019-11-04 Last updated: 2019-11-04Bibliographically approved
Gustafsson, C. & Nyström, J. (2019). Den svenska marknaden för godstransporter på järnväg: En analys av dominerande ställning. inköping: Statens väg- och transportforskningsinstitut
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Den svenska marknaden för godstransporter på järnväg: En analys av dominerande ställning
2019 (Swedish)Report (Other academic)
Alternative title[en]
The Swedish Market for Goods Transports by Rail : Analysis of Dominance
Abstract [sv]

Den svenska godsmarknaden på järnväg avreglerades år 1996. SJ avknoppade godsverksamheten 2001, till det separata men fortfarande statligt ägda företaget Green Cargo. Även om det sedan 1996 har etablerats nya företag är Green Cargo den största aktören på marknaden för godstransporter på järnväg. Konkurrensen har succesivt stärkts och Green Cargo har gått från monopolställning till en genomsnittlig marknadsandel på 55 procent för de svenska godstransporterna på järnväg. Bedömning av huruvida utnyttjande av dominerande ställning förekommer, består av tre kronologiska steg. Inledningsvis (1) definieras den relevanta marknaden, för att sedan kunna (2) beräkna företagets marknadsandel och huruvida de har en dominerande ställning samt (3) bedöma huruvida den dominerade aktören utnyttjat sin position otillbörligt. Föreliggande rapport syftar till att genomföra de två första stegen gällande godstransportmarknaden. Den övergripande frågan är huruvida godstransporter på järnväg ska betraktas som en gemensam marknad. Analysen genomförs i två delar. Den första är en traditionell konkurrensanalys som drivs av konkurrenslagstiftningen (SFS 2008:579) medan den andra avgränsar sig till enbart järnvägstransporter vilket motiveras utifrån EU-direktivet SERA (Single European Railway Area) och järnvägslagen (SFS 2004:519). Den traditionella konkurrensanalysen börjar med att definiera relevanta marknader enligt konkurrenslagen och existensen av dominerade aktörer på dessa marknader undersöks. Den andra analysen utgår från järnvägslagen och inkluderar endast godstransporter på järnväg. Dominansfrågan bedöms i denna andra del genom att beräkna marknadsandelar för de givna marknaderna systemtåg, vagnslast, kombitransporter (kombi) och malmtransporter på Malmbanan. I den andra delen av studien, som utgår från järnvägslagen, är marknaderna givna som systemtåg, vagnslast, kombitransporter och malmtransporter på Malmbanan. Givet dessa marknader beräknas marknadsandelarna för Green Cargo med hjälp av tillgängliga data och antaganden. Studien påvisar att den svenska godsmarknaden på järnväg inte bör ses som en enhetlig marknad. I den traditionella konkurrensanalysen definieras tre relevanta marknader. Green Cargo bedöms vara dominerade på tunga godstransporter i omfattande volymer till eller från industrier i det svenska inlandet där konkurrens från andra trafikslag saknas. På marknaden för medeltunga godstransporter inom Sverige är inte Green Cargo dominerande, då det förekommer konkurrens från andra trafikslag. Avgränsas marknaderna till att bara inkludera järnvägstransporter är Green Cargo dominerade på två av fyra marknader; systemtåg och vagnslasttransporter. En dominerade ställning är dock inte det samma som att konkurrensen inte fungerar.

Abstract [en]

The Swedish rail freight market was deregulated in 1996. This granted private and public firms access to the tracks and enabled competition with the former state-owned monopoly Statens Järnvägar (SJ). SJ separated the freight business in 2001, to the separate but still state-owned company Green Cargo. Competition on the rail freight market has been strengthened gradually and Green Cargo has gone from a monopoly position to an average market share of 55 percent. The company's market shares vary in the different sub-markets. Green Cargo is dominant in some sub-markets, but not all. Dominant companies in a market can be problematic and are regulated in the Swedish Competition Act “konkurrenslagen” (SFS 2008: 579). Importantly, it is not illegal to be dominant, but it is the abuse of a dominant position that is regulated. Assessment of possible abuse of a dominant position, consists of three chronological steps. Initially (1) the relevant market is defined, in order to then (2) calculate the company’s market share and whether it sustains a dominant position and (3) assess whether the dominant operator has abused its dominant position. This report aims to implement the first two steps concerning the freight transport market. The overall question is whether rail freight should be regarded as a common market. The analysis is carried out in two parts. The first is a traditional competition analysis driven by competition law (SFS 2008: 579), while the other is limited to rail transport alone, which is justified on the basis of the EU directive SERA (Single European Railway Area) and the Railway Act “järnvägslagen” (SFS 2004: 519). The traditional competition analysis begins with defining relevant markets according to the Competition Act, and the existence of dominant players in these markets is examined. The second analysis is based on the Railway Act and includes only rail freight transport. The dominance issue is assessed in this second part, by calculating market shares for the given market: block trains, single wagon load trains, combined trains and ore trains on the Malmbanan in Northern Sweden. In the second part of the study, which is based on the Swedish Railway Act, the markets are given as block trains, single wagon load trains, combined trains and ore trains on the Malmbanan. Given these markets, the market shares for Green Cargo are calculated using available data on tonkm and assumptions. Green Cargo is found to be dominant on single wagon load trains where they are alone, but also on block trains where they are estimated to have a market share above 50 percent. There are several companies with a significant market share in combined trains, and none of them is dominant. At the Malmbanan, Luossavaara–Kiirunavaara AB (LKAB) manages its own transport and is dominant. The study shows that the Swedish rail freight market should not be seen as a uniform market. In the traditional competition analysis, three relevant markets are defined. Green Cargo is found to be dominant in the market for heavy freight transport in large volumes to or from industries in the Swedish inland where competition from other modes of transport is missing. In the market for medium-heavy goods transport within Sweden, Green Cargo is not dominant, as there is competition from other types of traffic. Defining the markets to include only rail transport, Green Cargo is dominated by two of four markets; system trains and cargo transports. However, a dominant position does not per se mean there is imperfect competition.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
inköping: Statens väg- och transportforskningsinstitut, 2019. p. 41
Series
VTI notat ; 5-2019
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-13900 (URN)
Available from: 2019-05-22 Created: 2019-05-22 Last updated: 2019-06-14Bibliographically approved
Nyström, J. & Wikström, D. (2019). Empirical analysis of unbalanced bidding on Swedish roads. Stockholm: VTI
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Empirical analysis of unbalanced bidding on Swedish roads
2019 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Based on anecdotal evidence, claims are made that unbalanced bidding is a major problem in the construction industry. This concept refers to a sealed price auction setting with asymmetric information and unit prices, where information rents are extracted. Theoretical literature has shown that it is rational for an informed contractor to skew unit prices. However, empirical studies on the magnitude of the problem are lacking. As the first quantitative study based on European data, it is shown that unbalanced bidding exists, but in small magnitudes. The result is in line with earlier studies from the US.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: VTI, 2019. p. 29
Series
Working Papers, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute ; 2019:4
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-14094 (URN)
Available from: 2019-08-23 Created: 2019-08-23 Last updated: 2019-08-23Bibliographically approved
Olsson, N. O. E., Nyström, J. & Pyddoke, R. (2019). Governance regimes for large transport infrastructure investment projects: Comparative analysis of Norway and Sweden. Case Studies on Transport Policy
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Governance regimes for large transport infrastructure investment projects: Comparative analysis of Norway and Sweden
2019 (English)In: Case Studies on Transport Policy, ISSN 2213-624X, E-ISSN 2213-6258Article in journal (Refereed) In press
Abstract [en]

The two Nordic countries Norway and Sweden have launched governance regimes for the early phases of transport infrastructure investments after experiencing frequent cost overruns and low cost-benefit ratios. This study seeks to find out if these governance regimes have reduced the escalation of costs from early estimates to finalized projects and influenced the choice of projects away from those with lower benefit to cost ratios. We have compared governance regimes for major transport infrastructure investments in the two countries and examined the development and content of quality assurance activities, the involvement of internal and external parties, their duties and responsibilities, their stage gate models, and how decisions are made. The findings are that both countries have introduced formalizations of their governance regimes that mandate project reviews during the planning process and quality assurance, both of which have increased early cost estimates. One difference was that in Norway, the Ministry of Finance manages the quality assurance scheme and imposes external quality assurance requirements, while Sweden has no corresponding ministerial oversight. Therefore, on the one hand, the process is more strictly formalized in Norway, but on the other hand, cost-benefit ratios appear to have more weight in Sweden. Furthermore, although both countries have done several ex post evaluations, neither country has introduced a formalized ex post evaluation process allowing for systematic examination of the causes of cost overruns and low benefit to cost ratios. Even so, politicians may manoeuvre projects with lower benefit to cost ratios around the governance systems in both countries. Finally, some projects in both countries still have experienced significant cost escalations despite these processes.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier Ltd, 2019
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-14088 (URN)10.1016/j.cstp.2019.07.011 (DOI)2-s2.0-85069954289 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2019-08-20 Created: 2019-08-20 Last updated: 2019-08-20Bibliographically approved
Nilsson, J.-E., Nyström, J. & Salomonsson, J. (2019). Kostnadsöverskridande i Trafikverkets entreprenadkontrakt. Linköping
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Kostnadsöverskridande i Trafikverkets entreprenadkontrakt
2019 (Swedish)Report (Other academic)
Alternative title[en]
Cost overruns in construction contracts tendered by the Swedish Transport Administration
Abstract [sv]

Trafikverket har regeringens uppdrag att verka för en ökad produktivitet i anläggningsbranschen. VTI bistår Trafikverket i detta arbete. I denna rapport redovisas de skillnader som finns mellan det pris som fastställs i ett entreprenadkontrakt mellan Trafikverket och det företag som fått i uppdrag att genomföra en verksamhet och slutkostnaden för uppdraget. 776 kontrakt som avser entreprenader inom både väg- och järnvägssektorn och såväl investeringar som underhållsåtgärder och som kostar mer än 10 miljoner kronor, ingår i materialet.

Statistiska tester visar bland annat att risken för kostnadsöverskridanden är mycket stor och något högre för järnvägskontrakt (94 procents sannolikhet) än för vägkontrakt (86 procent). Slutkostnaden för vägkontrakt överskrider kontraktssumman med 20 procent vilket är signifikant lägre än för järnvägskontrakt där slutkostnaden i genomsnitt är 32 procent högre.

Abstract [en]

The Government has instructed the Swedish Transport Administration (Trafikverket) to promote productivity in the construction industry. VTI assists Trafikverket in this work. In this report, the differences that exist between the price set in the contract between Trafikverket and the construction company that has been commissioned to implement an activity and the final cost of the assignment are reported. 776 contracts relating to contracts in both the road and rail sectors and that comprises both investments and maintenance measures and which cost more than SEK 10 million are included in the material.

Statistical tests show, among other things, that the risk of cost overruns is very large, and slightly higher for railway contract (94 per cent probability) than for road contracts (86 per cent). The cost overrun for road contracts (1,20) is significantly lower than for rail contracts (1,32).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Linköping: , 2019. p. 63
Series
VTI rapport, ISSN 0347-6030 ; 1011
National Category
Economics and Business
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-13971 (URN)
Available from: 2019-06-05 Created: 2019-06-05 Last updated: 2019-06-05Bibliographically approved
Nyström, J. & Mandell, S. (2019). Skew to win, not to profit: unbalanced bidding among informed bidders. Journal of Public Procurement, 19(1), 46-54
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Skew to win, not to profit: unbalanced bidding among informed bidders
2019 (English)In: Journal of Public Procurement, ISSN 1535-0118, E-ISSN 2150-6930, Vol. 19, no 1, p. 46-54Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Purpose: Several sectors, especially the construction industry, use unit price contracting (UPC). This contracting form provides agents, ex ante, with estimated quantities of the work to be done. Competing agents then offer corresponding unit prices i.e. the bid is a price vectors, and most often the lowest vector sum is awarded the contract. This way of procuring is not only transparent but also entails a potential problem of unbalanced bidding. Unbalanced bidding occurs when an informed agent skews unit prices to win the ex ante bid. The concept is not new topic in research, but theoretical models from an economics perspective are not extensive.

Design/methodology/approach: This paper will focus on how competition among informed bidders will affect the optimal solution.

Findings: It is shown that skewing is still a dominating strategy under competition. However, competition will decrease, but not necessarily eliminate, information rents.

Originality/value: In this setting, unbalanced bidding could mainly be seen as a way to win the contract and not to extract information rents. Thus, it would not constitute an efficiency problem for the client.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Emerald Group Publishing Ltd., 2019
Keywords
Bid, Contract, Price, Variability, Competition, Contractor
National Category
Economics
Research subject
00 Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, 02 Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-13647 (URN)10.1108/JOPP-03-2019-024 (DOI)2-s2.0-85061774921 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2019-05-17 Created: 2019-05-17 Last updated: 2019-06-27Bibliographically approved
Nilsson, J.-E., Johansson, O., Nyström, J., Ridderstedt, I. & Wikström, D. (2018). Kostnadsanalyser av upphandlade kontrakt: två studier av investerings- och reinvesteringsprojekt. Linköping: Statens väg- och transportforskningsinstitut
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Kostnadsanalyser av upphandlade kontrakt: två studier av investerings- och reinvesteringsprojekt
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2018 (Swedish)Report (Other academic)
Alternative title[en]
Cost analysis of tendered contracts : two studies of infrastructure Investment and renewal projects
Abstract [sv]

I Trafikverkets uppdrag ingår att löpande förbättra verksamhetens produktivitet. Rapportens huvudsyfte är att lägga grund för att följa upp och vidareutveckla den verksamhet som genomförs. För detta ändamål redovisas resultaten av två studier. Den ena jämför kostnader i kontrakt med fakturerad slutkostnad medan den andra analyserar kostnaderna för upphandlade underhållsbeläggningar.

Avslutningsvis identifieras ett antal minimikrav som måste ställas på den information som krävs för att genomföra systematiska uppföljningar.

Abstract [en]

The Swedish Transport Agency’s mission includes continuously improving the productivity of operations. The main purpose of the report is to lay the groundwork for following up and further developing the activities carried out. For this purpose, the results of two studies are reported. The one compares costs in contract with invoiced final cost while the other analyses the cost of contracted maintenance costs.

Finally, several minimum requirements are identified that must be placed on the information required to carry out systematic follow-up.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Linköping: Statens väg- och transportforskningsinstitut, 2018. p. 55
Series
VTI rapport, ISSN 0347-6030 ; 976
Keywords
Contract, Procurement, Cost, Economic efficiency, Maintenance, Surfacing
National Category
Economics and Business
Research subject
10 Road: Transport, society, policy and planning
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-13147 (URN)
Available from: 2018-08-16 Created: 2018-07-09 Last updated: 2019-06-10Bibliographically approved
Olykke, G. S. & Nyström, J. (2017). Defining abnormally low tenders: A comparison between Sweden and Denmark. Journal of Competition Law, 13(4), 666-709
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Defining abnormally low tenders: A comparison between Sweden and Denmark
2017 (English)In: Journal of Competition Law, ISSN 1744-6414, E-ISSN 1744-6422, Vol. 13, no 4, p. 666-709Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The concept of an abnormally low tender is not defined in EU public procurement law. This article takes an interdisciplinary law and economics approach to examine a dataset consisting of Swedish and Danish judgments and verdicts concerning the concept of an abnormally low tender. The purpose is to determine how the concept has developed in practice in two Scandinavian countries with similar legal traditions, and whether the national solutions are economically efficient. The data indicate that economic operators use various pricing strategies which may result in tenders being rejected as abnormally low or the awards of contracts to such tenders being contested. The pricing strategies will (over time) result in the contracting authorities paying too high a price and they are, therefore, economically inefficient. It is concluded that diverse solutions to the handling of abnormally low tenders have developed in the two countries and, notably, that the approaches differ with regard to how they treat different pricing strategies. Thus, the solutions are also different in terms of economic efficiency.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2017
Keywords
Tender, Limit, Economic efficiency, Detection, Legislation
National Category
Law and Society
Research subject
00 Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, 02 Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-12820 (URN)10.1093/joclec/nhx027 (DOI)000424146600004 ()2-s2.0-85041493884 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2018-04-05 Created: 2018-04-05 Last updated: 2018-05-21Bibliographically approved
Nyström, J., Bröchner, J. & Mandell, S. (2017). Design-Build, Innovation, and Competition: The Role of Smaller Contractors. In: ICCREM 2017: Project Management and Construction Technology - Proceedings of the International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management 2017. Paper presented at 2017 International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management: Project Management and Construction Technology, ICCREM 2017, 10 November 2017 through 12 November 2017 (pp. 11-18). American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Design-Build, Innovation, and Competition: The Role of Smaller Contractors
2017 (English)In: ICCREM 2017: Project Management and Construction Technology - Proceedings of the International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management 2017, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) , 2017, p. 11-18Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Design-build (DB) contracting can be used to promote innovation in the infrastructure sector. Alongside innovation, public clients often wish to encourage competition. At a first glance, these two ambitions could be conflicting. More risk on the contractors stemming from DB might not appeal to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as they, ceteris paribus, have a risk disadvantage compared to larger firms. The research question is how more DB contracting will affect competition from a SME perspective. A simple model is provided to show how DBB stimulates competition and DB encourages innovation. Supported by semi-structured SME interviews from Sweden, it is discussed how the hybrid version of a controlled DB contract is inferior to alternative contract designs. The controlled DB contract does not stimulate competition nor provide incentives for innovation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), 2017
Keywords
Transport infrastructure, Contract, Development, Competition
National Category
Business Administration
Research subject
00 Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, 02 Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-12767 (URN)10.1061/9780784481080.002 (DOI)2-s2.0-85039838882 (Scopus ID)9780784481080 (ISBN)
Conference
2017 International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management: Project Management and Construction Technology, ICCREM 2017, 10 November 2017 through 12 November 2017
Available from: 2018-05-18 Created: 2018-05-18 Last updated: 2018-06-12Bibliographically approved
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