This paper suggests Delay Fees (DF) to handle temporary congestion during road works. The DF is paid by the contractor based on road users' loss of travel time due to construction. This decentralises the trade-off between construction costs and user time to the contractor, increasing social welfare. The contractor not only will account for user time during each single project, but also is incentivised to develop innovative construction techniques. Compared to other means in the literature for reducing temporary construction, the DF is more general in its focus on user time rather than lane closure.

This paper studies the experience of Europe's three most liberalised railways - Sweden, Germany and Britain - in opening-up rail passenger services to competition by means of competitive tendering, and seeks to draw lessons for countries that are just starting the process, such as France. It also comments on experience of competition in the market in these and other countries (this form of competition has been taken furthest in other countries - notably Italy and the Czech Republic, as well as on a single route in Austria). The paper fills an important gap in the literature - that has so far focused on econometric modelling of the impact of rail reforms - by considering how competition can best be introduced in practice. This investigation is important and timely given the requirements of EU legislation (4th Railway Package)which will require competition to be introduced into passenger rail services (by 2020 for commercial services, and 2023 for public transport contracts) across the whole of the EU. It finds evidence that competitive tendering has helped increase demand for and reduce subsidies to the rail passenger sector, but that there are many decisions that have to be taken as to how it is to be implemented. Short gross cost contracts may work well for regional services where the tendering authority takes the lead in planning and marketing such services. If services where ticket revenue recovers a larger share of costs – “more commercial services” – are to be tendered, long net cost contracts may make more sense. An alternative is to leave them operated by the incumbent but with open access for competitors to enter the market. Two particular issues face countries starting on the liberalisation process. Firstly, if existing rolling stock is owned by the incumbent rather than the franchising authority or an independent company; that remains a major barrier to entry. The second is the position of existing staff. If new operators are required to take them on at existing wages and conditions; that is a barrier to improved efficiency, but for new operators to recruit their own staff may also be problematic, particularly where the pace of change is fast.

Trafikverket har regeringens uppdrag att verka för en ökad produktivitet i anläggningsbranschen. VTI bistår Trafikverket i detta arbete. I denna rapport redovisas de skillnader som finns mellan det pris som fastställs i ett entreprenadkontrakt mellan Trafikverket och det företag som fått i uppdrag att genomföra en verksamhet och slutkostnaden för uppdraget. 776 kontrakt som avser entreprenader inom både väg- och järnvägssektorn och såväl investeringar som underhållsåtgärder och som kostar mer än 10 miljoner kronor, ingår i materialet.

Statistiska tester visar bland annat att risken för kostnadsöverskridanden är mycket stor och något högre för järnvägskontrakt (94 procents sannolikhet) än för vägkontrakt (86 procent). Slutkostnaden för vägkontrakt överskrider kontraktssumman med 20 procent vilket är signifikant lägre än för järnvägskontrakt där slutkostnaden i genomsnitt är 32 procent högre.

The Government has instructed the Swedish Transport Administration (Trafikverket) to promote productivity in the construction industry. VTI assists Trafikverket in this work. In this report, the differences that exist between the price set in the contract between Trafikverket and the construction company that has been commissioned to implement an activity and the final cost of the assignment are reported. 776 contracts relating to contracts in both the road and rail sectors and that comprises both investments and maintenance measures and which cost more than SEK 10 million are included in the material.

Statistical tests show, among other things, that the risk of cost overruns is very large, and slightly higher for railway contract (94 per cent probability) than for road contracts (86 per cent). The cost overrun for road contracts (1,20) is significantly lower than for rail contracts (1,32).

Beginning as a planning tool within Sweden's national road administration some 50 years ago, benefit-cost analysis (BCA) has come to be a pillar of the national transport policy because of subsequent strategic choices made by the national parliament. These choices made it necessary to widen the analysis of costs to include also externalities and a foregone conclusion was that efficient investment priorities should be made based on BCA. But no one asked whether the political decision makers or the BCA models were up to that task. This paper reviews the institutional framework and practice of BCA in Sweden for transport infrastructure investment, and considers design issues that have been and still are debated, such as whether the discount rate should include a risk term and how to account for the marginal cost of public funds. A main concern with BCA results is the underestimation of construction costs, making transport sector projects look better than they are. Several ex post analyses have established that a higher NPV ratio increases the probability of being included in the investment program proposal prepared by the agency. The requirement to let projects undergo BCA seems to make planners trim project proposals by trying to reduce investment costs without significantly reducing benefits. This relationship is weaker among profitable projects. Moreover, there is no correlation between rate of return and the probability of being included in the final program, which is established on political grounds.

I Trafikverkets uppdrag ingår att löpande förbättra verksamhetens produktivitet. Rapportens huvudsyfte är att lägga grund för att följa upp och vidareutveckla den verksamhet som genomförs. För detta ändamål redovisas resultaten av två studier. Den ena jämför kostnader i kontrakt med fakturerad slutkostnad medan den andra analyserar kostnaderna för upphandlade underhållsbeläggningar.

Avslutningsvis identifieras ett antal minimikrav som måste ställas på den information som krävs för att genomföra systematiska uppföljningar.

The Swedish Transport Agency’s mission includes continuously improving the productivity of operations. The main purpose of the report is to lay the groundwork for following up and further developing the activities carried out. For this purpose, the results of two studies are reported. The one compares costs in contract with invoiced final cost while the other analyses the cost of contracted maintenance costs.

Finally, several minimum requirements are identified that must be placed on the information required to carry out systematic follow-up.

Reinvesteringar i järnvägsanläggningar påverkas av trafik och utgör därför en komponent i marginalkostnaden för nyttjandet av infrastrukturen. Tidigare studier har traditionellt fokuserat på reinvesteringskostnader i banöverbyggnad. I denna studie skattas separata marginalkostnader för reinvesteringar i Bana (banöverbyggnad, banunderbyggnad, bangårdar), El, Signal, Tele och Övriga anläggningar. Trots att slitage av exempelvis signal- och teleanläggningar inte torde variera med trafik, finner vi statistiskt signifikanta samband mellan trafik och reinvesteringar i samtliga anläggningar. En förklaring är att trafikökningen innebär en ökad störningskostnad, även i frånvaron av ett trafikberoende slitage, och därmed att reinvesteringen tidigareläggs. Analysen visar även att de skattade effekterna främst kommer från jämförelser mellan bandelar, vilket innebär en risk att de (delvis) är korrelationer och inte kausala samband mellan trafik och reinvesteringar. När marginalkostnaderna för anläggningsgrupperna läggs samman hamnar de på 0,0141 kr per bruttotonkilometer och 4,4520 kr per tågkilometer.

Med start 2013 har VTI i tre regeringsuppdrag haft till uppgift att förbättra kunskapen om trafikens samhällsekonomiska kostnader. SAMKOST 3 har omfattat alla trafikslag, men fokus har legat på sjö- och luftfart. Huvudsyftet för analysen är att förbättra kunskapen om trafikens externa kostnader dvs. kostnader för olyckor, trängsel, buller, luftföroreningar och klimatpåverkan. Denna slutrapport sammanfattar resultaten av de delrapporter som tagits fram för att tillgodose syftet. En viktig del av analysen har handlat om en fördjupad diskussion kring den roll som koldioxidskatten på drivmedel har för att begränsa utsläppen från användning av fossila bränslen.

Starting in 2013, VTI has been tasked with three government missions to improve knowledge about the traffic's socioeconomic costs. SAMKOST 3 has covered all modes of transport, but focus has been on maritime transport and aviation. The main purpose of the analysis is to improve the knowledge about the external costs of the traffic i.e. costs of accidents, congestion, noise, air pollution and climate impact. This final report summarizes the results of the sub-reports that have been prepared to meet the purpose. An important part of the analysis has been an in-depth discussion of the role of Sweden’s carbon dioxide tax on fuels to limit emissions.

In this study, we analyze the difference between survival and corner solution models in estimating the marginal cost of reinvestments. Both approaches describe the reinvestment process in rather intuitively similar ways but have several methodological distinctions. We use Swedish railway data on track segment and section levels over the period 1999-2016 and focus on reinvestments in track superstructure. Results suggest the marginal costs from survival and corner solution models are SEK 0.0041 and SEK 0.0103, respectively. The conclusion is that the corner solution model is more appropriate, as this method consider the impact traffic has on the risk of reinvestment as well as on the size of the reinvestment cost. The survival approach does not consider the latter, which is problematic when we have systematic variations in costs due to traffic and infrastructure characteristics.

Detta notat som skrivits på uppdrag av Riksrevisionen har som utgångspunkt att resandet inte utvecklats i enlighet med de prognoser som låg till grund för beslutet om att bygga Arlandabanan. I separata promemorior i detta notat studeras två aspekter av att förändra förutsättningarna för den trafik som idag bedrivs på Arlandabanan.

 Vilka konsekvenser skulle en förändrad prisstrategi innebära?

 Finns tillräcklig kapacitet för att öka trafiken?

In year 2000, railway operations started between Arlanda airport and downtown Stockholm. The service is part of a PPP contract that includes construction and maintenance as well as service provision for a period of 45 years after the initiation of traffic. Patronage on the line is below expectations at the time of contract closure in 1993. There is therefore an ongoing discussion of whether it would be appropriate for the government to renegotiate the contract to change the preconditions for the service. Commissioned by Riksrevisionen, the Swedish National Audit Office, this memo addresses two aspects of a possible change of strategy:

 Which would the consequences be of a change of pricing strategy from the current targeting of the high end of the market? A 30 percent price reduction is considered.

 Is there enough track capacity to increase the number of departures during peak hours?

Utredningen om finansiering av offentliga infrastrukturinvesteringar via skatter, avgifter och privat kapital (dir. 2016:59) gav i oktober 2015 VTI i uppdrag att redogöra för svenska och internationella erfarenheter av privat finansiering av statlig transportinfrastruktur. Denna rapport baseras på en litteraturgenomgång med fokus på de senaste 10 åren. Genomgången bekräftar och underbygger ytterligare de observationer som tidigare gjorts om ämnet: OPS-projekt färdigställs mera ofta inom den ursprungliga tidsramen och kostnadsöverskridanden är mindre vanliga. Däremot finns inga exempel på projektuppföljningar som ger en samlad bild av för- och nackdelar med sådana projekt.

A government committee has asked VTI to give an account of domestic and international experiences of private funding of public infrastructure investment under the Public Private Partnership (PPP) format. This report is based on a literature review focusing the development of the most recent 10-year period. The report confirms and strengthens previous conclusions on the subject: PPP projects are typically opened for traffic on time and at lower cost overruns than projects implemented under traditional types of contracts. There are, however, no comprehensive empirical ex post reviews identifying pros and cons of the PPP approach to infrastructure construction and maintenance.