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Grahn-Voorneveld, Sofia
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Publications (10 of 11) Show all publications
Grahn-Voorneveld, S. (2014). The inefficiency of marginal cost pricing on roads. Stockholm: Centre for Transport Studies
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The inefficiency of marginal cost pricing on roads
2014 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The economic principle of road pricing is that a road toll should equal the marginal cost imposed by an additional user, since this will lead to efficient use of the transport facility. However, when the road is used by traffic both from the road providing region as well as by traffic from another region, the supplied road standard is likely to be too low, since the consumer surplus of the users from outside the region is not taken into account. This can be solved by letting an authority level higher than the road supplier use taxes and earmarked transactions to raise the road standard. (In Europe we see this done in the Trans European Network). To do this the higher authority needs very detailed information about the road and the users on local level. Further raising taxes and transactions also involve costs that can be substantial. Another problem is that transactions of this type it is hard to separate from other political interference. This paper analyzes how a limited toll on top of the marginal cost can serve the purpose of solving this problem locally, without involving a higher authority.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Centre for Transport Studies, 2014. p. 24
Series
CTS Working Paper ; 2014:16
Keywords
Road pricing, Mathematical model
National Category
Economics
Research subject
00 Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, 02 Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-7282 (URN)
Available from: 2014-10-15 Created: 2014-10-15 Last updated: 2016-02-03Bibliographically approved
Grahn-Voorneveld, S. (2013). The effects of  decentralized capacity decisions for congested self-financed roads. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 56, 49-60
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The effects of  decentralized capacity decisions for congested self-financed roads
2013 (English)In: Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, ISSN 0965-8564, E-ISSN 1879-2375, Vol. 56, p. 49-60Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper studies the differences between centralized and decentralized decisions for capacity and road user charges on a congested self-financed road with local, national and international traffic. Road user charges are allowed only to cover the costs for providing the road with a specific capacity, and to cover external costs caused by traffic.

The road is either provided by the nation, or else this responsibility is decentralized to the community.The results of this paper show that it can matter significantly on what level such a decision is made. A decentralized decision leads to a total wellfare loss, and there is both a national and international interest for not decentralizing such decisions

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2013
Keywords
Road pricing, Decentralization, Decision process, Financing, Capacity (road, footway), External effect, Economic justification
National Category
Economics
Research subject
00 Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, 02 Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-302 (URN)10.1016/j.tra.2013.08.005 (DOI)
External cooperation:
Available from: 2013-11-14 Created: 2013-11-14 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
Westin, J., Franklin, J., Grahn-Voorneveld, S. & Proost, S. (2012). How to decide on regional infrastructure to achieve intra-regional acceptability and interregional consensus?. Papers in regional science (Print), 91(3), 617-643
Open this publication in new window or tab >>How to decide on regional infrastructure to achieve intra-regional acceptability and interregional consensus?
2012 (English)In: Papers in regional science (Print), ISSN 1056-8190, E-ISSN 1435-5957, Vol. 91, no 3, p. 617-643Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Many regions face through-traffic that causes local negative externalities. Regions might respond by imposing user charges or investing in bypass transport infrastructure. In this paper two levels of decision-making are studied: co-operation among regions and acceptability within regions. If left to a single region, it will overcharge for usage and under-invest in bypass capacity. Through interregional co-operation, an efficient outcome can be reached. Without compensation within each region, intraregional acceptability constraints protecting certain interest groups can lead to inefficient tolling. This can explain political preferences for tolling bypasses and not city centre roads.

Keywords
Financing, Local authority, Road
National Category
Social Sciences Other Social Sciences
Research subject
Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-385 (URN)10.1111/j.1435-5957.2012.00445.x (DOI)
Available from: 2013-11-26 Created: 2013-11-26 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
Grahn-Voorneveld, S. (2012). Sharing costs in Swedish road ownership associations. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 46(4), 645-651
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Sharing costs in Swedish road ownership associations
2012 (English)In: Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, ISSN 0965-8564, E-ISSN 1879-2375, Vol. 46, no 4, p. 645-651Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Usually transport systems, and roads in particular, are viewed as public goods. However, this is not always the case. In Sweden a large part of the road system is privately owned. Most of these privately owned roads are rural roads used by farmers and summer cottage owners, or used for forest transport. These roads are mainly provided by ownership associations. An important difference between public roads and these privately owned roads is that all investments- and maintenance decisions are made by the users themselves, who also have to pay the costs, whereas the usual case is that the owners/providers of a road-system are different agents than the users. Here the question is not how to charge the roads but how to split the costs of the roads among the users in an efficient and "fair" way. The motivation of this paper is the practical problem of how such an ownership association can divide the costs for the road network among the members in an efficient and "fair" way. The problem is treated from a game theoretical point of view, making use of the Shapley value. This means that the problem is associated with a game - a mathematical representation of the conflict situation. The Shapley value is a very important solution concept for cooperative games, like the game in this case. For games corresponding to this specific type of problems, it is shown that the Shapley value has excellent properties, such as beeing an element of the core, and beeing very easy to compute

Keywords
Road network, Cost, Mathematical model, Games theory
National Category
Social Sciences
Research subject
Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-386 (URN)10.1016/j.tra.2011.11.014 (DOI)000302826700001 ()
Available from: 2013-11-26 Created: 2013-11-26 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
Grahn-Voorneveld, S. (2011). Sharing costs in Swedish road ownership associations. Stockholm: Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI), KTH Royal Institute of Technology, S-WoPEc, Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Sharing costs in Swedish road ownership associations
2011 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Usually transport systems, and roads in particular, are viewed as public goods. However, this is not always the case. In Sweden a large part of the road system is privately owned. Most of these privately owned roads are rural roads used by farmers and summer cottage owners, or used for forest transport. The roads are mainly provided by ownership associations. The motivation of this paper is the practical problem of how such an ownership association can dicide the costs for the road netword among the members in a "fair" way. The problem is treated from a game theoretical point of view, making use of the Shapley value. This means that the problem is associated with a game – a mathematical representation of the conflict situation. The Shapley value is a very important solution concept for cooperative games, like tha game in this case. For games corresponding to this specific type of problems, it is shown that the Shapley value has excellent properties, such as being an element of the core, and being very easy to compute.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI), KTH Royal Institute of Technology, S-WoPEc, Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics, 2011. p. 12
Series
CTS Working Paper ; 2011:6
Keywords
Road network, Cost, Mathematical model, Games theory
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-640 (URN)
Available from: 2013-12-03 Created: 2013-12-03 Last updated: 2014-03-17Bibliographically approved
Grahn-Voorneveld, S. (2011). Sharing profit in parallel and serial transport networks. Stockholm: Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI), KTH Royal Institute of Technology, S-WoPEc, Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Sharing profit in parallel and serial transport networks
2011 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This paper studies the incentives for different countries to cooperate concerning pricing in transport systems, and how to handle the profit from such cooperation. Two types of simple networks with congestion are considered; one with parallel links, and one serial network with a number of consecutive links. The owner of each link tolls the traffic using the link. First the incentives for cooperative behavior among the countries are studied, and shown to be considerable. This is done by using non-cooperative game theory. Second, cooperative game theory is used to analyse solution concepts for allocating the resources raised from cooperation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI), KTH Royal Institute of Technology, S-WoPEc, Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics, 2011. p. 47
Series
CTS Working Paper ; 2011:7
Keywords
Transport network, Transnational network, Road pricing, Reward (incentive), Profit, Mathematical model, Games theory
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-641 (URN)
Available from: 2013-12-03 Created: 2013-12-03 Last updated: 2014-03-17Bibliographically approved
Nilsson, J.-E., Arnek, M., Abrantes, P., Grahn-Voorneveld, S., Nash, C. & Toner, J. (2008). Implications of cost recovery.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Implications of cost recovery
Show others...
2008 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Under some circumstances, the marginal cost approach to infrastructure pricing leads to problems with cost recovery; a pricing policy which ensures that existing assets are efficiently used may not deliver revenue to pay for the costs for maintenance of existing, nor indeed for construction of new infrastructure. For different reasons governments may find this inappropriate and rather want to complement the marginal-cost-pricing principle with a requirement for a sector of the economy to break even. Efficiency would then be jeopardised. The idea behind work package 2 is to establish the micro-aspects of requirements to recover costs over and above marginal costs. This is done for all modes of transport. More precisely, the objective of this report is to establish some core features of how each mode of transport is organised, to describe the implications of cost recovery requirements for each mode and to analyse different mechanisms which would ascertain that each mode covers a larger share of its own costs.

Publisher
p. 146
Series
CATRIN ; D3
Keywords
Transport infrastructure, Road network, Railway network, Airport, Port, Use, Maintenance, Cost, Tariff, Road pricing, Calculation, Method, Mathematical model
National Category
Economics
Research subject
SAB, Prd Aircrafts, air transport and airports; SAB, Prz Ships and shipping; J00 Railway: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, J13 Railway: Economics; 00 Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, 02 Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-6983 (URN)
Projects
CATRIN - Cost allocation of transport infrastructure cost
Available from: 2014-09-11 Created: 2014-09-11 Last updated: 2016-02-25Bibliographically approved
Voorneveld, M., Tijs, S. & Grahn, S. (2003). Monotonic allocation schemes in clan games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 56(3), 439-449
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Monotonic allocation schemes in clan games
2003 (English)In: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, ISSN 1432-2994, E-ISSN 1432-5217, Vol. 56, no 3, p. 439-449Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Total clan games are characterized using monotonicity, veto power of the clan members, and a concavity condition reflecting the decreasing marginal contribution of non-clan members to growing coalitions. This decreasing marginal contribution is incorporated in the notion of a bi-monotonic allocation scheme, where the value of each coalition is divided over its members in such a way that the clan members receive a higher, and the non-clan members a lower share as the coalitions grow larger. Each core element of a total clan game can be extended to both a population monotonic and a bi-monotonic allocation scheme. In total clan games where the clan consists of a single member (the so-called big boss) the use of the nucleolus as an allocation mechanism gives rise to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme.

Keywords
Organization (administration)
National Category
Economics
Research subject
SAB, Qa Economics and finance
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-387 (URN)10.1007/s001860200240 (DOI)000180816000006 ()
External cooperation:
Available from: 2013-11-26 Created: 2013-11-26 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
Voorneveld, M. & Grahn, S. (2002). Cost allocations in Shortest Path games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 56(2), 323-340
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Cost allocations in Shortest Path games
2002 (English)In: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, ISSN 1432-2994, E-ISSN 1432-5217, Vol. 56, no 2, p. 323-340Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

A class of cooperative games arising from shortest path problems is defined. These shortest path games are totally balanced and allow a population-monotonic allocation scheme. Possible methods for obtaining core elements are indicated; first, by relating to the allocation rules in taxation and bankruptcy problems, second, by constructing an explicit rule that takes opportunity costs into account by considering the costs of the second best alternative and that rewards players who are crucial to the construction of the shortest path. The core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell are shown to coincide. Finally, noncooperative games arising from shortest path problems are introduced, in which players make bids or claims on paths. The core allocations of the cooperative shortest path game coincide with the payoff vectors in the strong Nash equilibria of the associated noncooperative shortest path game.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer: , 2002
Keywords
Economics
National Category
Social Sciences
Research subject
Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, Road: Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-6719 (URN)10.1007/s001860200222 (DOI)000179527000012 ()
Available from: 2014-01-17 Created: 2014-01-17 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
Grahn, S. & Voorneveld, M. (2001). Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes in Bankruptcy Games. Annals of Operations Research, 109(1-4), 315-327
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes in Bankruptcy Games
2001 (English)In: Annals of Operations Research, ISSN 0254-5330, E-ISSN 1572-9338, Vol. 109, no 1-4, p. 315-327Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The USA Bankruptcy Code legislates the bankruptcy of firms. Any allocation mechanism that is legal according to the Bankruptcy Code is necessarily population monotonic. Bankruptcy rules yielding a population monotonic allocation scheme in the associated bankruptcy game are characterized by efficiency, reasonability (each claimant receives a nonnegative amount not exceeding his claim), and the thieve property. The thieve property for bankruptcy problems entails that if a claimant manages to escape with his claim, the amount allocated to each remaining claimant is not larger than his share in the original problem. Many bankruptcy rules studied in the literature are efficient, reasonable, self-consistent, and monotonic. Rules satisfying these axioms are shown to yield population monotonic allocation schemes.

Keywords
Organization (administration)
National Category
Economics
Research subject
SAB, Q Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-389 (URN)10.1023/A:1016316622277 (DOI)000176807400017 ()
External cooperation:
Available from: 2013-11-26 Created: 2013-11-26 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
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