Congestion charges and labour market imperfections: “Wider economic benefits” or “losses”?

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Abstract
The presence of distortive taxation and agglomeration benefits in the labour market means that there are benefits and losses not captured by standard cost-benefit analyses of transport policy measures. Recent theoretical analyses have raised concerns that the labour market effects of congestion charges may constitute considerable losses in the form of reduced aggregate labour income, over and above what is captured by the consumer surplus in the standard analysis of congestion charges – possibly to the extent that congestion charges may reduce aggregate social welfare, contrary to conventional wisdom in transport economics. The sign and size of these effects are an empirical question, however. We investigate this issue by estimating the labour income effects of the Stockholm congestion charges, using an estimated relationship between workplace accessibility and labour income. Results show positive effects on labour income, meaning that the “wider economic benefits” of this system are in fact benefits, not losses. It turns out to be crucial that the model accounts for value-of-time heterogeneity in the income/accessibility relationship and in the calculation of generalized travel costs.

Keywords: Congestion pricing, wider economic benefits, labour market distortions, cost-benefit analysis.

JEL Codes: R41, R48, D62
1 INTRODUCTION

It is a well-established result within transport economics that congestion charges can yield a considerable social surplus in congested road systems. The theoretical argument is obvious: pricing external congestion effects to make user costs better reflect social marginal costs will in general result in a positive social surplus. Moreover, suggested or implemented real-world congestion charging systems have also been shown to result in significant net social surpluses, provided that investment and operations costs are not too high, and provided that practical restrictions of the design of the charges are not too severe.

However, the standard analysis is confined to effects within the transport sector, i.e. travel times and travel costs as valued by travellers. The standard analysis implicitly assumes that effects in other sectors either do not exist or are correctly priced, and thus can be disregarded. But the transport system is closely linked to the labour market, and the labour market is subject to several market imperfections, such as distortive taxation, scale economies, agglomeration benefits and imperfect competition, all of which create costs and benefits which are external to the worker. In an influential paper, Parry and Bento (Parry and Bento, 2001) showed that the increase in generalized travel costs due to congestion charges may cause losses due to reduced labour supply at the extensive margin which are large enough to cancel out the transport-related benefits. This discussion has continued in a stream of literature (Parry and Bento, 2002)(Pilegaard and Fosgerau, 2008)(De Borger, 2009); (Van Dender, 2003). Arnott (Arnott, 2007) makes a similar point related to agglomeration effects.

This is the counterpart to the discussion of “wider economic benefits” in transport CBA – i.e., that there are benefits in the labour market that are not captured by the standard transport appraisal framework. Distortive taxation and external agglomeration benefits mean that a worker will not perceive the full social benefits of increasing working hours, going from unemployment to work, or taking a better paid job further away from home. Since standard transport CBA only include consumer surplus as perceived by the worker/traveller, standard appraisal will not capture any increases in profits or tax revenues that are caused by an increase in working hours or productivity – hence the term “wider economic benefits”. The same goes for congestion charges, but in this case the “wider economic benefits” may be losses, since generalized travel costs usually increase by congestion charges (although this is not always the case for all groups, as we will see later on). The problem, as pointed out by Parry and Bento (Parry and Bento, 2001)(Parry and Bento, 2002), is that these losses may be significant – in fact, they may be larger than the benefits in the transport market.

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1 In addition, environmental benefits such as reduced emissions and noise are often included. These are almost always positive, though, so it does not change the line of reason here.
In the Parry and Bento model, the effect of congestion charges on aggregate labour income is always negative. This is because of two key assumptions: the congestion charges increase the generalized travel costs for all travellers, and labour supply only changes at the extensive margin. But once any of these assumptions are relaxed, it is easy to get a model where the sign of the labour income effect is indeterminate (Westin, 2011a)(Westin, 2011b). First, as to how generalized travel costs change, they may in fact decrease for some groups of travellers. This may be because they have high values of time, or because of network effects, i.e. congestion reductions “spilling back” on links that are adjacent to the tolled ones. Heterogeneity in the value of travel time may be caused by differences in wage or travel purpose. Typically, the “wider economic benefits” associated with high-value-of-time trips can be expected to be larger, since the wage gradient with respect to commuting radius tend to be higher for high-income workers. Second, as to how labour supply adjusts, even if generalized travel costs increase and hence decrease labour participation and labour market matching, the decreased travel times for those still commuting by car may lead to the number of working hours may go up. Summarizing, not just the magnitude but also the sign of the labour income effects is indeterminate from a theoretical point of view. Determining the sign and size of the effects is hence an empirical question, and the outcome is likely to be different depending on the specific economic and geographic circumstances.

In this paper, we investigate this issue using an estimated relationship between labour income and workplace accessibility. To reduce endogeneity and confounding problems, the model is based on how changes in workplace accessibility are related to changes in income, as opposed to the common practice of cross-sectional estimation. We use accessibility measures taken from a large-scale transport model estimated on travel survey data. This means that changes in the transport system will be properly captured by the accessibility measure, and also ensures a high degree of behavioural realism. The accessibility measures take heterogeneity in the value time into account. This is crucial for evaluating effects of congestion charges, since whether the generalized travel cost increase or decreases depends on the value of time. The income/accessibility elasticity is also estimated separately for different value-of-time categories. It turns out, as one would expect, that the income effect of an accessibility increase is larger for groups with higher values of time. Estimations are based on “quasi-disaggregate” data, where individuals are grouped into segments based on location and socioeconomic characteristics.

Since the sign of labour income effects is indeterminate from a theoretical point of view, one needs to study a specific case to reach any conclusion. In this study, we apply the model to the Stockholm congestion charging system. This also enables us to calibrate traveller responses and travel time savings against observed data. Eliasson (Eliasson, 2009a) presents a cost-benefit analysis of the congestion charging system. That study concludes that the system creates a social surplus, but also points out that labour market effects are not included. In that sense, the present study can be viewed as a complement to the CBA in Eliasson (Eliasson, 2009a).
Section 2 briefly summarizes the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the Stockholm congestion charges. Section 4 describes the estimated relationship between workplace accessibility and labour income. This is then applied in section 5, where the effect on labour income of the Stockholm congestion charges is estimated. Section 6 concludes.

2 LITERATURE

2.1 Agglomeration benefits, tax distortions and transport CBA

One of the cornerstones of “new economic geography” is the link between accessibility and productivity. There are several theoretical reasons why productivity is expected to increase with accessibility, often summarized in the catchphrase “sharing, matching and learning” (Duranton and Puga, 2004). The relation between accessibility and productivity is also well established empirically (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Several studies have shown a connection between productivity and various measures of the spatial density of economic activity, e.g. Ciccone and Hall (1996), Combes et al. (2008) and Groot et al. (2011). In economic geography the effects of market accessibility on wages have been studied on a larger spatial scale by e.g. Redding and Venables (2004) and Hering and Poncet (2010). If the results are to be used as a complement to standard transport appraisal, however, the agglomeration measure needs to be sensitive to changes in the transport system, which density measures typically are not. Studies using various measures of accessibility to labour include Kaliski et al. (2000), Graham (2007a, 2007b, 2009), (Graham and Kim, 2008).

Hence, the existence of agglomeration benefits is well established. But agglomeration benefits are only partially captured by standard transport appraisal. To quote Graham and van Dender (2011): “Such benefits are in theory additional to those captured in a standard CBA because they are sourced from increasing returns that are external to the firm and thus would not feature in the willingness-to-pay approach that underpins calculations of consumer surplus.” In other words, since agglomeration benefits are external to the worker/traveller, they are not captured by the consumer surplus, and hence not by standard CBA.

Agglomeration benefits are not the only external benefits of work-related choices. Distortive taxation means that the worker will only perceive part of an increase in wage, employment or working hours. Hence, such benefits are also only partially captured by the consumer surplus used in CBA, as pointed out by Forsyth (1980). Venables (2007) stress that when there is both distortive taxation and agglomeration benefits, the external share of benefits will increase. Calthrop et al. (2010) show that failure to account for distortions such as agglomeration effects and tax distortions may cause severe errors in cost-benefit analyses of transport improvements. So far, few countries have included “wider economic benefits” in their standard CBA guidelines. One exception is the UK CBA guidelines. The methodology and a number of case studies are summarized in Jenkins et al. (2011).
There are still comparatively few studies of precisely how much of total benefits that is captured by transport CBA, however, and moreover, our understanding of these relationships and the related econometrics are still limited, as pointed out by Graham and van Dender (2011). They show that the estimated relationship between accessibility and productivity is highly dependent on model specification, indicating severe problems with confounding and endogeneity.

2.2 Congestion pricing, labour market distortions and heterogeneity in the value of time

Parry and Bento (2001, 2002) point out that a congestion charge will affect labour supply negatively at the extensive margin. Congestion charges may also affect labour market matching negatively, since generalized travel costs increase for many workers (depending on their value of time). In the Parry-Bento model, it is the income tax wedge that is the root of the problem, but such problems may also be caused or exacerbated by the presence of (external) agglomeration effects. Arnott (2007) points out that agglomeration externalities may imply that the level of the optimal congestion tax is below the corresponding congestion externality costs.

The quantitative estimates in Parry and Bento (2001) rest on the assumption that an increase in travel costs caused by congestion charges will have similar effects on labour supply as an increase of income taxes. A general finding in labour economics is that income tax changes have the greatest impact on labour supply at the extensive margin, rather than at the intensive margin or through matching effects (Kleven and Kreiner, 2006). However, it is not obvious that introducing congestion charges affects labour supply in the same way that an increased income tax would do. In our view, it seems unlikely that a charge on car drivers in urban cores during rush hours would lead to an appreciable fraction of this population segment choosing to leave the labour force (i.e. adjust at the extensive margin), especially in European conditions where typically a large majority of the low-skilled workers use other modes than car for commuting trips to central areas during rush hours. Effects on matching (or “destination choice” in transport model terminology) and working hours seem to be more plausible adaptations.

If travellers have heterogeneous the values of time, then the standard analysis of congestion charges will typically underestimate the benefits of the policy. This was pointed out already by Vickrey (1969), but at the time, the understanding of value-of-time heterogeneity was limited, and few attempts were made to analyse what this meant for the quantitative results. Verhoef and Small (2004) give a detailed analysis of the issue. Proper estimation of value-of-time distributions, together with socioeconomic explanatory variables, have been made possible only recently (Fosgerau, 2006, 2007; Börjesson et al., forthcoming). In this paper, we use the results from the Swedish Value of Time study, which was the first to successfully identify the full value-of-time distribution (Börjesson et al., forthcoming; Börjesson and Eliasson, 2011).
3 THE STOCKHOLM CONGESTION CHARGING SYSTEM

The City of Stockholm has around 0.8 million inhabitants, and is the central part of the Stockholm county, with a total of 2 million inhabitants. Around 2/3 of the City inhabitants live within the toll cordon, and the rest outside the cordon. Because of its topology, with lots of water and well-preserved green wedges, road congestion levels in Stockholm are high compared to the city’s moderate size. Before the introduction of the congestion charges, the main roads arterials leading to, from and within the city centre had congestion indices typically averaging around 200% (i.e. three times the free-flow travel time).

The Stockholm congestion charging system consists of a toll cordon around the inner city (Figure 1), thereby reducing traffic through the main bottlenecks located at the arterials leading into the inner city. The cost of passing the cordon between 6.30 and 18.30 weekdays is 20 SEK (approx. 2€) during peak hours (7:30–8:30, 16:30–18:00), 15 SEK during the shoulders of the peaks (30 min before and after peak period) and 10 SEK during the rest of the charged period.

The charges were introduced in January 2006, and have reduced traffic across the cordon by 22% during charged hours, with considerable reductions in congestion levels as a consequence. The effects have stayed remarkably stable, increasing somewhat over time when controlling for inflation and growth in population and car ownership (Börjesson et al., 2010). Eliasson (2009a) provides a cost-benefit analysis of the charges based on measurements of traffic flows and travel times, calculating the value of travel time benefits to around 60 M€ per year. This can be compared to gross revenues of around 80 M€ per year. The CBA uses a standard transport appraisal framework, and hence explicitly excludes “wider economic benefits” (or losses) in the form of labour market effects apart from what is captured by work trip consumer surplus. The present study hence complements the standard CBA in Eliasson (2009a). Travel time benefits were calculated to be split in approximately equal shares between commuting trips, leisure trips, business trips and freight transport (the two latter categories are smaller in terms of traffic volumes but have higher values of time). The calculations were based on a uniform value of time for each traffic category, and are hence likely to underestimate the true benefits.

The system, its history and its effects have been described in detail elsewhere. A description of the system and its effects can be found in Eliasson et al. (2009), and experiences from the design and evaluation processes are described in (2009b). Eliasson (2008) summarises the main lessons in terms of design, effects, acceptability and political process. A detailed account of the political process can be found in Gullberg and Isaksson (2009).
4 MODELING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME AND ACCESSIBILITY

In this section, we will estimate a relationship between labour income and workplace accessibility. Compared to many similar relationships reported in the literature, the model estimated here differs in five ways:

1. It is estimated on differences across time rather than cross-sectional data, thereby reducing the endogeneity problems that riddle cross-sectional studies of accessibility/productivity relationships. After all, correlation does not prove causality. If it is observed that highly productive people and firms are more common in high-accessibility locations – is this because productive people and firms choose to locate in such places (which they may do for several reasons), or have they been made productive by the high-accessibility location? It is only the latter mechanism that is relevant if we want to use an estimated relationship to calculate accessibility benefits of an improvement in the transport system. The model used here reduces this problem by relating changes in income to changes in accessibility. To further reduce endogeneity problems and isolate the impact of changes in the transport system, the change in accessibility is decomposed into one part capturing the change in employment in each zone, and one part capturing only the change in generalized travel costs. It is the latter part that is used to model the impact of the congestion charges.

2. It is estimated on “quasi-disaggregate” data. The entire population is divided into segments based on location and socioeconomic characteristics, and the average labour income is calculated for each such segment. One such segment then constitutes one observation.
3. It is based on accessibility measures from a transport model, rather than density or size measures. If we want to capture the increase in agglomeration effects due to a transport investment, the measure of agglomeration needs to be sensitive to changes in the transport system, which size or density measures typically are not. It also has the benefit that the accessibility measures are based on actual commuting behaviour and actual, perceived generalized costs. Finally, it is an aggregation across all modes based on actual mode shares.

4. Generalized travel costs account for heterogeneity in the value of travel time. This turns out to be crucial for results. A traveller with a high value of time will perceive that his generalized travel cost is reduced by congestion charges, and vice versa. Ignoring this heterogeneity would mean that one of the foremost benefits of congestion charges is ignored – that it “sorts” trips into high-value and low-value trips, and reduces the latter while prioritizing the former.

5. The income/accessibility relationship is different depending on the value of travel time of the segment. This also turns out to be important. Segments with higher value of time (which is correlated with higher income, although this is not the only factor) turn out to have much larger income/accessibility elasticity than segments with low values of time. This is natural, considering that the former segments are typically higher educated and more specialized, and hence typically experience a steeper wage gradient when accepting a longer commuting radius.

4.1 Model specification

The entire working population in the study area (4 million workers in Sweden, 1.8 million in the Mälaren Valley) is divided into segments, where each segment is a combination of age (7 categories), gender (2), ethnic origin (3), educational level (4) and residential municipality (290 for Sweden, 86 for the Mälaren Valley). The average income\(^2\) for each segment is observed for the years 1993 and 2002. This is regressed on initial accessibility (year 1985) and changes in accessibility, one part due to changes in the transport system (1985-1997) and one part due to changes in employment per zone (1993-2002). The choice of years is mainly a matter of data availability: in particular, getting detailed data on historical transport systems is a major effort\(^3\).

Let \(E_s^0\) be the number of workplaces in municipality \(s\) at time 0 (1985). \(c^0_{rs}\) is the generalized travel cost between municipality \(r\) and \(s\) at time 0 (described below), and \(\rho\) is a sensitivity parameter estimated in the transport model (see below). Workplace accessibility of municipality \(r\) at time 0 is then defined as

\[
M^0_r = \sum_s E_s^0 \exp(\rho c^0_{rs})
\]

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\(^2\) “Income” means wage before taxes, excluding wage overhead costs.

\(^3\) We have also tested using income and employment data for the years 1985 and 1997, i.e. for the same years as travel costs, with generally similar results.
The accessibility change due to changes in generalized travel costs is based on the travel cost change 1985-1997, using employment data from 1993. The change in accessibility due to changes in generalized travel costs is defined as

$$\Delta_c M_r = \frac{\sum_s E^3_s \exp (\rho c^{0}_{rs})}{\sum_s E^1_s \exp (\rho c^{0}_{rs})}$$

$c^{0}_{rs}$ and $c^{2}_{rs}$ are generalized costs in the years 1985 and 1997. $E^1_s$ is the employment in municipality $s$ in 1993.

The accessibility change due to employment changes is based on the employment change 1993-2002, using generalized travel costs from 1985. The change in workplace accessibility due to changes in employment per zone is defined as

$$\Delta_e M_r = \frac{\sum_s E^3_s \exp (\rho c^{0}_{rs})}{\sum_s E^1_s \exp (\rho c^{0}_{rs})}$$

$E^1_s$ is the number of workplaces in municipality $s$ in the year 1993, while $E^3_s$ is the corresponding number in the year 2002.

With these variables, we can estimate a model for average income $y^{3}_{nr}$ of segment $n$ and zone $r$ at time 3 (2002). Note that the income at time 1 (1993) is also included.

$$\log (y^{3}_{nr}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \log (y^{1}_{nr}) + \beta_2 \delta^{age}_n + \beta_3 \delta^{gender}_n + \beta_4 \delta^{ethnic}_n + \beta_5 \delta^{edu}_n$$

$$+ \beta_6 \log (M^0_{nr}) + \beta_7 \log (\Delta_c M_r) + \beta_8 \log (\Delta_e M_r) + \epsilon$$

The $\delta$'s are vectors of dummy variables, and $\beta_2$-$\beta_5$ are the corresponding parameter vectors. Later on, we will differentiate the accessibility variables by value of time.

Above, we used generalized travel costs between municipalities. But the transport model works with traffic zones, which are much smaller: typical sizes are in the order of 0.1-1 km$^2$ in built-up areas. Let $c_{ijm}$ be generalized travel cost between traffic zones $i$ and $j$ with mode $m$, where

$$c_{ijm} = b_{ijm} + \theta t_{ijm}$$

$b_{ijm}$ is the monetary travel cost, $\theta$ the value of time, and $t_{ijm}$ is the generalized travel time (where waiting times and access times are weighted differently than in-vehicle time). Relative time weights are taken from the traffic model LuTrans. LuTrans is a large-scale transport model, a version of the national transport model SAMPERS (Algers and Beser, 2001), downscaled in certain respects (primarily in the number of socioeconomic groups).
Generalized costs depend on the value of time in two ways. Obviously, the value of time enters the definition. But car travel costs and travel times in fact also depend on the value of time, especially when road pricing is introduced, since the route choice will be different depending on the value of time: drivers with low value of time will be more willing to take detours to avoid tolls. To account for this, segments are grouped into three equally sized categories according to their value of time. The value of time for each category is taken to be the median value of the lower, middle and upper third of the lognormal value-of-time distribution estimated in the national Value of Time study (Börjesson and Eliasson, 2011). For each origin zone, the share of the population belonging to each value of time category is calculated, based on income, the number of children and whether the zone is in Stockholm county (again using results from Börjesson and Eliasson (2011)). Separate travel cost and travel time matrices are then calculated for each category, by running the LuTrans model using the three value-of-time categories in the network assignment step.

To calculate the generalized travel cost between municipalities \( r \) and \( s \), generalized travel costs between traffic zones are weighted with traveling flows \( T_{ijm} \). These are taken from the traffic model LuTrans.

\[
c_{rs} = \frac{\sum_{i \in r} \sum_{j \in s} \sum_{m} T_{ijm} c_{ijm}}{\sum_{i \in r} \sum_{j \in s} \sum_{m} T_{ijm}}
\]

The notation \( i \in r \) means that summation is taken over all traffic zones \( i \) belonging to municipality \( r \).

4.2 Estimation results

Estimation results are reported in
Table 1. All models are estimated using OLS. Model [1] is estimated on all of Sweden, without accounting for heterogeneity in the value of time. The estimated elasticity of labour income with respect to initial accessibility (log $M_0$), is 0.044, while the estimate for the change in accessibility due to changes in the transport system (log $\Delta_c M_r$) is slightly lower, 0.03. The estimate for the change in accessibility due to changes in zonal employment has no significant effect. These elasticities are in the expected range; for example, Graham and van Dender (2011) state that studies relating productivity to city size have typically yielded elasticities in the range 0.02-0.10; Venables (2007) give a similar range of 0.04-0.11. But as Graham and van Dender (2011) point out, such aggregate elasticities are likely to be subject to confounding and endogeneity effects. The estimation results presented here attempts to control for these effects at least to some extent controlling for initial accessibility and the change in the number of workplaces. The estimated effect on final income from initial accessibility can be interpreted as capturing the effect that high-income workplaces and people tend to move to high-accessibility locations. Not controlling for this would then be a source of endogeneity bias.

Some of the estimation results indicate that there is unexplained heterogeneity: in particular, the influence of initial income is conspicuously low – one would expect a strong correlation between initial income and income in the next time period. The socioeconomic variables show expected results: income increases faster for middle-age, male, high-education and native-Sweden segments.

Model [2] is estimated only on municipalities in the Mälaren Valley Region, which includes the Greater Stockholm region. While all parameters for individual (segment) characteristics are very similar to [1], it can be noticed that larger effects are indicated with respect to general accessibility and a transport-induced change in accessibility. This outcome is expected, as this region includes the largest labour market region in Sweden, with better opportunities for matching in the labour market than in other regions. This result also implies that it can be questioned whether the elasticities are constant over the sample.

Model [3] is also estimated on Mälaren Valley only, but the generalized costs in the accessibility variables have been adjusted. Instead of using a single value of travel time taken from the transport model (as in [1] and [2]), the value of time is different across segments. Segments are grouped into three value-of-time categories as explained above, so the generalized travel cost will be different for each segment. As a result the elasticity increases from 0.044 to 0.053, while the standard error is unchanged. This suggests that taking differences in the value of travel time into account makes the generalized travel cost variable more precise. However, this makes the assumption of constant elasticities across the sample even more questionable.

Models [4a]-[4c] are separate models for each value-of-time category. Due to collinearity a number of dummy variables for segment characteristics have been

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4 This is about the same size as a related estimate for UK, reported in Venables (2007).
omitted in these equations. The estimates indicate that the elasticity with respect to initial accessibility \( M^0 \), and with respect to transport-induced accessibility change \( \Delta M_t \), increases considerably with the value of time. This confirms the expectation that workers with high income and higher education tend to have better opportunities to benefit from the variety and specialization offered by a larger labour market. Moreover, the correlation between initial income and final income is now much higher, also indicating a better model fit.
Table 1 Estimated income equations for workers in Sweden and Mälaren Valley. Dependent variable: log(income) 2002 (average per segment).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical specification</th>
<th>[1]</th>
<th>[2]</th>
<th>[3]</th>
<th>[4a]</th>
<th>[4b]</th>
<th>[4c]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographical region</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Mälaren Valley</td>
<td>Mälaren Valley</td>
<td>Mälaren Valley</td>
<td>Mälaren Valley</td>
<td>Mälaren Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VoT Segment</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Low VoT</td>
<td>Medium VoT</td>
<td>High VoT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Income 1993</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.823</td>
<td>0.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 21-30</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31-40</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>0.661</td>
<td>0.665</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 41-50</td>
<td>0.775</td>
<td>0.745</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51-60</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.151</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age 61-70</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>0.562</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.070</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age 71+</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.095</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tertiary education &lt; 3 years</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary education ≥ 3 years</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.111</td>
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<tr>
<td>Native Sweden</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.095</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native other Nordic</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Mt</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log ∆Mt</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log ∆Mt</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.062</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.108</td>
<td>3.730</td>
<td>3.749</td>
<td>2.239</td>
<td>1.159</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.904</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>0.713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>14817</td>
<td>5232</td>
<td>5232</td>
<td>1744</td>
<td>1744</td>
<td>1744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors (White heteroskedasticity-consistent) are reported under parameters; estimates in bold are significant at the 95%-level; omitted categories for dummy variables are Female, Age<21, Primary education, and non-Nordic native country.

5 EFFECTS OF CONGESTION CHARGES ON LABOUR INCOME

With the model described above, we can simulate the effects on aggregate labour income of the introduction of the congestion charges. Accessibility measures with and without the congestion charges are calculated using the transport model LuTrans. The changes in travel times due to the charges are calibrated against travel time measurements from the situations before and after the congestion charges (spring 2005 compared to spring 2006). Then, the elasticities of labour income with respect to a transport costs-related change in...
accessibility (from models [4]-[6]) are used to assess the change in labour income. Obviously, these effects do not happen at once: the calculation results are indicative of what can be expected in the long run (such as the ten-year period the estimation results are based on).

Figure 2 illustrates the variation of the value of time – the colours show the share of the population in each zone belonging to the “high” value of time category.

Table 2 shows the calculated change in labour income for each municipality and value of time category. Note that whether the accessibility (and hence labour income) increases or decreases varies with the value of time. For high values of time, the decreased travel time is worth more than the increased travel cost, and vice versa for low values of time. The sign of the accessibility change also varies with location. For several municipalities, accessibility increases even for the middle value of time category. One reason for this is network effects.
traffic decreases all over the county, even many travellers that do not pay the charge benefit from reduced congestion.

Table 2 The congestion tax system in Stockholm: Estimated effects on wage sum in 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>VTT category, share of workers in municipality</th>
<th>Effect on wage sum by VTT category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MSEC 1000 SEK</td>
<td>MSEC 1000 SEK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danderyd</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>0.274</td>
<td>0.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nacka</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lidingö</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Täby</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sollentuna</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Järfälla</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solna</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundbyberg</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huddinge</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upplands-Väsby</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyresö</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekerö</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Värmdö</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaxholm</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upplands-Bro</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botkyrka</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vallentuna</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Österåker</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haninge</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salem</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigtuna</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norrtälje</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Södertälje</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nynäshamn</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nykvarn</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.294</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.340</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main conclusion is that the aggregate effect on labour income is in fact positive, totalling 60 M€/year\(^5\). This is far from obvious, and it is impossible to know whether this should be expected to be a general result. Intuitively, groups with high values of time get increased accessibility, while groups with low values of time get decreased accessibility. Some travellers may also gain accessibility due to network effects (“spillback” of congestion reductions). The aggregate change in accessibility may be either positive or negative. But the model estimations showed that changes in accessibility affects labour income more for high-income groups than for low-income group. This is intuitively plausible, since high values of time are correlated with high income and high education, and such groups generally get higher wage premiums for increasing

\(^5\) This includes the negative effect on the “low” value-of-time category, which is based on an insignificant parameters estimate. Excluding this effect would increase the total effect and hence strengthen the general conclusion.
work trip length. Hence, one may have positive effects on labour income even if aggregate accessibility decreases.

As we argued at the outset, the sign of labour income effects is an empirical question. In this case study, the effect on labour income turned out to be positive. This is an interesting finding, since the literature on labour market effects of congestion charges have often concluded that these will be negative, usually on the basis of simplified theoretical models. Our results show that reverse results may be obtained once the model allows for network effects, heterogeneity in values of time, and heterogeneity in the relationship between accessibility and labour income for different income/education segments.

Allowing for the two types of heterogeneity (in the value of time and in the relationship between accessibility and income) is crucial. If model [2] is used, where the travel costs and accessibility effects do not vary with the value of time, the aggregate income effect changes from +62 M€/year to -17 M€/year.

Obviously, the size of the income effect should be regarded with caution for several reasons. In particular, estimations of income/accessibility relationships tend to be riddled with confounding and endogeneity bias. Results do suggest, however, that the aggregate income effect from the Stockholm congestion charges are positive and of a considerable magnitude.

5.1 A comparison with an increased fuel tax

It is illuminating to compare the effects of the congestion charging system with the effects of a fuel tax, designed to give the same tax revenues. In contrast to the congestion charges, this does not give any appreciable travel time savings, so accessibility decreases for all groups. Consequently, the fuel tax has quite different consequences for labour income.

The size of the decrease varies between municipalities and between value-of-time categories in the same municipality. This variation can mainly be explained by the variation in the car modal share, which is linked to variation in land use pattern and supply of public transport.

While the congestion tax was estimated to increase labour income with over 60 M€/year, the fuel tax is estimated to decrease labour income with nearly 95 M€/year. On average, the estimated effect of the fuel tax is a reduction of wage sum by around 0.4% in each VTT category. However, there is a considerable variation between municipalities; the decrease in labour income is estimated to vary between 0.1% and 1.1%.

6 CONCLUSIONS

In the standard theoretical model, it is clear that congestion charges will generate a social surplus. As shown in several studies (e.g. (Eliasson, 2009a)), this will often also hold in the real world, even when technical costs have to be
Congestion charges and the labour market

covered and practical considerations place restrictions on the design of the charges.

But in an economy with labour market imperfections such as distortive taxation and agglomeration benefits, the “wider economic” effects of congestion charges not captured by standard transport CBA may be negative. As shown by e.g. (Parry and Bento, 2001), these negative effects may be so large that they cancel the positive social surplus on the transport market. But the real effects of congestion charges are complex and the mechanisms work in different directions. Increased travel costs may reduce matching and labour participation; improved travel times work in the opposite direction, and may also increase working hours; different groups have different values of time, so the sign of the change in generalized travel costs may be different for different groups; and different groups will have different wage premiums with respect to commuting radius and hence different relationships between accessibility and income. This means that the sign of labour market effects is an empirical question, likely to be different between different economic and geographical conditions.

In this paper, we have assessed this by estimating a relationship between accessibility and income. The relationship takes differences in values of travel time into account, and also that the income/accessibility elasticity may be different for different groups. The estimation shows that categories with high value of time have a considerably stronger relationship between accessibility and income than low value-of-time groups. Accessibility measures are constructed using output and parameters from a large-scale transport model, making them consistent with observed travel behaviour. Previous studies on labour market effects have often assumed that the reaction to congestion charges will be similar to the reaction of a change in income tax. Instead, we use accessibility measures ultimately derived from observed travel behaviour, through a large-scale transport model.

Applying the estimated relationship to the Stockholm congestion charges, we concluded that the labour market effects were in fact positive, amounting to around 60 M€/year. This can be compared with gross revenues, which are around 80 M€/year, the net consumer surplus, which is around -28 M€/year, and the net social benefit (net of investment costs) of a standard CBA, which is around 65 M€/year (all figures are taken from (Eliasson, 2009a)). Hence, in this case, labour market effects do not cancel the social surplus from transport effects; in fact, they add significantly to it. Note, though, that the whole labour income effect cannot be added to the transport CBA – part of it is captured by the work trip travel time benefits in the CBA, which accounts for around a quarter of the total travel time benefits.

7 REFERENCES


