Comparing three models for introduction of competition into railways – is a Big Wolf so Bad after all?

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Abstract
This paper compares the experience of three European countries with long experience of competition in rail transport – Britain, Sweden and Germany. Britain is characterised by complete separation of infrastructure from operations, competition either for or in the market for the entire passenger network, open access for freight with two large operators and several smaller ones, strong regulation and careful attention to financial incentives. Sweden also has complete vertical separation, competitive tendering for all subsidised services, open access for freight and now also for commercial passenger services. Regulation, although now strengthened, is not as tight as in Britain. At the other extreme, Germany still has the dominant operator and the infrastructure company as subsidiaries to the same holding company, the regulator has had repeated disputes regarding their powers and – although there is some tendering of subsidised passenger services and open access for commercial passenger and freight – the incumbent still dominates the market. According to the general expectations of theoretical reasoning, we would expect the British approach to be the most successful in achieving an efficient, competitive rail system, with Sweden next and Germany least successful. But an examination of subsidy levels and trends in passenger and freight traffic finds that Germany has the slowest growth in public financial support for its railway as well as the lowest fares. Both Britain and Sweden have had faster growth in public financial support than Germany, although this has mainly been in infrastructure renewal and enhancement, and there has been debate as to the adequacy of current infrastructure spending in Germany. On most measures, Britain has lower absolute levels of financial support than Germany as well as faster traffic growth. Sweden clearly has much higher financial support, although this may be the result of low population density. Thus on balance it is not clear that the reform process has worked better in the other countries than in Germany, despite initial expectations. Further in depth research on the reasons for these changes in financial support and traffic levels would be needed to reach a more conclusive answer.

Keywords: Deregulation, market opening, vertical separation, railway competition

JEL Codes: D02, H54

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1. INTRODUCTION
Against a background of a financially bleeding industry with continuously shrinking market shares, and starting in 1991 with Directive 91/440, the European Commission has introduced a succession of measures designed to open up the European rail market to competition (Nash, 2009). These measures involve separating infrastructure from operations (at least in terms of accounting and of responsibility for key charging and capacity allocation decisions) and creating access rights for new passenger and freight operators. Measures have been extended and consolidated in three railway packages of the last decade, providing for complete open access for commercial freight and international passenger operators. At the time of writing, the Commission is considering further measures in the form of a revision of the first railway package, and whether to extend access in the passenger market through requiring either open access or competitive tendering for domestic passenger services (Nash, 2010).

Economic theory generally predicts that increases in competition will lead to improved services and lower costs. Thus we might expect that the further competition has advanced in a particular country, the more traffic will have grown and costs and subsidies decreased.

There are some provisos however. There is good evidence that whilst rail systems are not subject to major economies of scale, they do experience economies of traffic density. That is to say that, other things being equal, a particular level of output on a certain route is achieved more cheaply by a single operator than by two or more (Caves et al, 1987). Whilst much of this may relate to the infrastructure, and EU policy accepts that infrastructure will remain a natural monopoly, there is some evidence that this also applies to vertically separated passenger operators (Wheat and Smith, 2010). As a consequence, the presumption of entry and competition to further welfare is not necessarily correct for the railway industry.

Public passenger transport is also subject to the so-called Mohring effect (Mohring, 1972). This reflects the fact that as more services are operated, passengers on high frequency routes have to wait less time at the station or bus stop; on lower frequency services where passengers plan their journeys, they are more likely to be able to get a service when they want it, or in other words schedule delay is reduced. When services are split between different operators whose tickets are not interchangeable, effective frequency is reduced. Moreover services may be bunched at particular departure times rather than achieving an ideal spread (Hotelling, 1929) and connections may suffer. There is evidence that a well-planned and integrated timetable offering regular interval services and good connections can considerably enhance traffic, revenue and benefits (Johnson et al, 2006). Thus having a dominant operator might be better in terms of attracting traffic than a fragmented passenger network with a variety of operators.

It is argued that competition for the market in the form of competitive tendering for franchises may preserve the benefits of economies of density and integrated services whilst driving out inefficiency and – depending on how this is achieved – give incentives to improve service quality (Demsetz, 1968). The big advantage of this approach is that it is consistent with maintaining unprofitable but socially desirable services, either by direct subsidy or by cross subsidy within a franchise.

There has been much debate as to whether achieving fair competition between an incumbent and open access operators and/or franchisees requires complete vertical separation of infrastructure from operations. An alternative would be to go for a degree of separation within a vertically integrated company and admit competing operators into this system. A strong
independent regulator is likely to be needed in such a model to ensure that the infrastructure manager does not discriminate in favour of their own operations.

A number of econometric studies of railway industry costs have been done over the years but appear to reach no consensus on whether vertical separation is necessary or sufficient for franchising to deliver according to the theoretical predictions. From applying a translog cost function approach to Japanese rail companies, Mituzami and Shoji (2004) conclude that there is no impact of vertical separation versus integration on cost for operating and maintaining infrastructure. A number of studies have established that the separation of infrastructure from operations may increase costs due to a loss of economies of scope (e.g. Bitzan, 2003; Ivaldi and McCullough, 2001, Jensen and Stelling, 2007). However, except for the latter study, these relate to the US context and therefore primarily study vertically integrated railroads. Friebel et al. (2004) show for a set of European railways that in particular sequentially introduced deregulation measures had a positive impact on productivity while reforms introduced as a package did not improve efficiency. However, their deregulation metric does not explicitly reflect vertical separation but rather third party access and the question whether an independent regulator was established.

Growitsch and Wetzel (2009) find significant diseconomies from separation of infrastructure and operations in Europe, but their study is based on a static cross section comparison and does not allow for the impact of differences in geography or rail policy, and consequently in the volume and nature of the traffic on costs. Whilst it has often been argued that transaction costs would be a major disadvantage from vertical separation, Merkert (2009) concludes that whilst these are higher in vertically separated railways, the difference would only account for around 1% of rail system costs.

Of the most recent studies (Cantos et al, 2010) fully allows for differences in the nature of the traffic by introducing traffic density and mean train loads into a second stage regression of the efficiency scores. They find that productivity growth is faster when vertical separation is combined with increased competition in the freight market; by contrast passenger franchising does not seem to improve efficiency. Similar to this, Mituzani and Uranishi (2010) conclude from an econometric analysis of railways from OECD countries that vertical separation leads to cost reductions in particular for railways with low train density while railways with higher train density experience cost increases from vertical separation.

Econometric studies suffer from the fact that there is a relatively small sample of countries to deal with, that there are significant differences in the way in which reform has been carried out amongst them, and that few countries have seen significant levels of competition, particularly in the passenger market. There are also serious problems in ensuring that data are comparable. This is the motive for using an in depth case study approach to examine the three countries in which reforms to introduce competition have advanced the furthest. That is the purpose of this paper.

In this, we approach the comparisons with the hypothesis that countries with more complete degrees of vertical separation and with greater competition in freight and passenger train operations will, other things being equal, experience better services, higher rail traffic growth and lower costs and subsidies. As noted above, this analysis must acknowledge that there are advantages to vertical integration and to better integration of services which might overthrow these expectations.
The countries in question are Britain, Sweden and Germany, the three countries with longest experience and most open markets (see IBM and Humbolt University of Berlin, 2011). A number of previous papers have considered the experiences of these individual countries particularly with a focus on passenger franchising; see for instance Smith, Nash and Wheat (2009), Alexandersson and Hultén (2007), Lalive and Schmutzler (2007), Beck (2010) and Link and Merkert (2011), whilst overall assessments of the reforms of each country at a time are contained in Drew and Ludewig (2011). But we are not aware of a previous attempt to make a direct comparison of them, and to see what lessons can be drawn from their relative performance.

The subsequent text will elaborate on the differences in the way in which the three countries have opened up the rail market. But in addition, the countries exhibit both similarities and differences in network structure and traffic mix. Table 1 illustrates the difference in size as well as the amount of services provided, with Germany much the largest and Sweden the smallest. It also shows that the density of traffic per track kilometre is similar between all three. Germany and Sweden have between a quarter and a third of train kilometres in the freight sector, whilst passenger operations dominate in Britain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of reform</th>
<th>Train km, m</th>
<th>Thereof passenger</th>
<th>Franchised, percent of pass. train km</th>
<th>Train km/track km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain 1994</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>16.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 1994</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>14.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden 1988</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Features of reform and networks in three countries. 2008.

In the following we summarise the institutional setting in the countries in section 2, use section 3 to formulate conjectures, section 4 to confront conjectures with data before reaching our conclusions in section 5.

2. THE INSTITUTIONS IN THE THREE COUNTRIES
The description of the way in which the three countries have organised their respective railway sector is separated into a description of the model for vertical separation and of the market for passenger services in sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. The freight market is in principle open for entry in all three countries and does therefore not require a separate description. We will however include freight also in the description of consequences of the changes in section 4.

2.1 Vertical separation
A large share of the rail system’s costs emanates from infrastructure investment and maintenance and the quality of service depends on the infrastructure’s performance. The relationship between operators and the infrastructure manager is therefore crucial to the success of any organisational structure with vertical separation. It is in this area that the differences between the regimes of the three countries are most pronounced.

Britain: Britain’s model is one of complete separation and dismantling of the incumbent with competitive tendering for all passenger services. In addition, there is open access for freight and a limited degree of open access for commercial passenger operators outside the franchising system. Initially the infrastructure was privatised, but following the bankruptcy of
Railtrack, it was taken over by a ‘not for profit’ company still nominally private but dependent on government to guarantee its debts.

A passenger or freight train operating company negotiates a track access agreement with the infrastructure manager. This bestows a right to a certain amount of capacity on the operator for a number of years, but the slots are defined with a degree of flexing permitted; that is to say the timetable can be modified by moving a train a certain number of minutes earlier or later than its current slot in order to accommodate other services. There is an annual timetabling round in which an operator may propose changes or request additional slots. The infrastructure manager is required to follow a set of criteria in considering priorities which take account both of the social costs and benefits of the service and of practical issues such as continuity. There is an appeals committee composed of users of the line, and ultimately dissatisfied operators may appeal to the Regulator.

Most stations, depots and terminals are owned by Network Rail but leased to individual operators for day to day operation; separate charges apply. Other operators can access them but must share the costs; where necessary, these access rights are protected by the regulator.

The existing contractual arrangements include a number of incentive mechanisms designed to influence operator behaviour. The first of these is the infrastructure charges. Passenger franchisees pay a fixed charge, based on a share of the fixed costs of the network, but this is of no particular significance in terms of incentives, as it presumably simply affects the level of the bid in terms of subsidy or premium. The usage charge is levied per vehicle kilometre on the basis of estimated infrastructure wear and tear cost and includes a high degree of differentiation according to the characteristics of the rolling stock. There is also a congestion charge, based on the level of reactionary delays as a result of high levels of capacity utilisation, which varies by service group.

A second incentive mechanism is the performance regime, which requires train operators to pay Network Rail for delays they cause, thus incentivising reliability. In turn, Network Rail compensates TOCs for other delays, including those for which Network Rail are responsible themselves and those caused by other TOCs. The intention is that any revenue shortfall caused by poor performance due to factors not under the control of the TOC will be made up for by these payments.

Changes in track access charges during the course of a franchise are passed through to the state in a change in subsidy or premium and do not affect the financial position of the TOC. When refranchising occurs, bidders will allow for the level of track access charges in the level of bids. Since the TOC is substantially protected from failings in performance by the infrastructure manager by compensation under the performance regime, the TOC has limited incentive to press the infrastructure manager on matters of cost and performance. This is made up for by a strong regulator who does indeed conduct benchmarking studies and press the infrastructure manager on these issues, and ultimately has powers including not just control of charges but also to levy fines, which it has exercised for instance in the case of serious disruption to services due to late running engineering works.

Germany: Germany’s 1994 separation came with complete open access for both passenger and freight. Both the infrastructure manager DB Netz and the transport companies such as DB Regio (non-commercial services), DB Schenker Rail (freight) and DB Bahn Fernverkehr (long distance passenger services) are part of the DB Holding Company. At the time of writing, the
German government seems to be preparing a policy proposal which would prevent transfers within the holding company as a means to reduce cross subsidization (OEPNV aktuell 2011), presumably with an intent to facilitate entry.

Both DB and non-DB operators must negotiate track access with DB Netz and also require access to other infrastructure facilities operated by DB companies such as DB Station & Service and DB Energy. Most marshalling yards, workshops etc. are also owned by DB companies. Since there is no space for establishing their own facilities in urban areas, non-DB operators need to use maintenance facilities and workshops owned by DB.

Germany faced a 10 year period of no regulation of network access and access charges. The Bundesnetzagentur (BNA, the regulatory body for the utility sectors such as electricity, gas, telecommunications and postal services) is responsible for supervising also the rail market since 2006, in particular in order to safeguard non-discriminatory access to rail infrastructure. However, the BNA’s legal competences for introducing and conducting regulatory procedures in the rail market are more restricted than in the other sectors. For example, the right to obtain data and information from the incumbent is not clearly defined and frequently leads to court disputes. Furthermore, the oversight of unbundling issues is not delegated to BNA.

Germany’s track access charges are based on a full cost recovery regime and are among the highest in Europe (ITF, 2008). The charging scheme currently in use is a tariff comprising base charges differentiated by track category and track utilization, and so-called product charges. These reflect prioritization in time tabling, several multiplicative or additive surcharges for higher weights, special trains etc. Until a decision of BNA from May 2010, so-called regional surcharges were raised specifically for regional passenger trains (Link, 2004, provides more details). Track access charges are usually part of the cost calculation in the bid and represent a transitory item for operators, i.e. they are financed within the franchise contracts and thus finally paid for by the PTAs.

Rules for allocation of common costs within the access charging scheme are complex, making it uncertain to establish whether charges are cost based or not. Regulatory bodies in Germany are not entitled to require a transparent and verifiable design for track access charges, but BNA has recently suggested a price-cap regulation and the debate on this is ongoing (see also Commission of Monopolies 2009).

Access charges for regional passenger services are relatively high due to the multiplier for regional surcharges which range from 1.05 up to 1.91 (and an average factor of 1.4). This introduces problems for non-DB operators which cannot benefit from profit/loss sharing as DB does, and for the PTAs which have to bear these costs within their budgets. At the time of writing, BNA has decided that from December 2011 onwards DB Netz is no longer allowed to apply the regional surcharges (for details see BNA 2010).

Regional rail passenger services enjoy high priority in timetabling implying that they run little risk not to be allocated timetable slots. Since 2005 track users can agree framework contracts for track access with DB Netz which cover up to 5 years. This also includes a performance regime, which requires train operators to pay DB Netz for delays they cause, while in turn DB Netz compensates train operators for those delays for which DB Netz is responsible. This scheme foresees a charge of 0.10 Euro per minute delay of a train, i.e. a very low penalty. In practice, however, it was mostly train operators which had to pay fines for delays while DB Netz could hardly be made responsible due to vague performance definitions and inadequate penalties. BNA has decided that DB Netz has to revise the penalty scheme (BNA 2009a).

A further large block of infrastructure costs for train operators are station charges. The system distinguishes 6 categories of stations with regard to their importance. As of 2008, the charges
range from €1.05 up to €36 per train stop. BNA has forbidden the scheme in 2009 and has requested DB to submit a new proposal for the scheme (BNA 2009b).

**Sweden:** Sweden separated infrastructure from operations in 1988, but the market for freight services was not opened for entry until 1998 and passenger services will only be completely opened in 2012. The infrastructure manager is a government agency, now responsible for roads and rail infrastructure.

Sweden has no formal long term track access agreements. However, operators of non-commercial services expect to be able to retain the slots they need to operate the service they are contracted to run.

Infrastructure charges are relatively simple, based on the estimated wear and tear cost per gross tonne kilometre. Additional charges are levied for external costs of accidents at level crossings, air pollution in the case of diesel trains, for the costs of information systems as well as a contribution to the cost of the Oresund Bridge. Since the rates are amongst the lowest in Europe (ITF, 2008), with little differentiation according to vehicle characteristics, the incentivising properties of this system are poor, and it makes no contribution to allocating scarce capacity.

Sweden is currently implementing a performance regime to meet the requirements of Directive 2001/14. Sweden’s regulator, the Swedish Transport Agency, has up till recently been more involved in technical issues and safety concerns and in hearing appeals rather than in enforcement of efficiency and performance of the infrastructure manager.

### 2.2 The passenger market

**Britain:** Virtually all rail passenger services in Britain, commercial or subsidised, were franchised out over the period 1994-7. With the exception of services devolved to the national or local authorities, responsibility for all franchises rests with the Department for Transport (DfT). DfT adopts a common approach and contracts mainly differ due to the date at which tenders were let, as the approach to tendering has changed over time.

DfT currently specifies a minimum level of service and regulates some fares whilst leaving the operator some flexibility as to what service to provide and what fares to charge; it is proposed to increase that flexibility in future franchises. Bidders pre-qualifying are invited to tender in terms of the subsidy they will require or the premium they will be willing to pay for each year of the franchise in order to provide a specified level of service. In assessing the bids, deliverability is regarded as a key issue; bidders are required to produce robust delivery plans, and if the most favourable financial bid is seen as too risky it will not be selected. Subject to this, the winner is selected on the basis of the most favourable financial offer in terms of risk adjusted discounted present value on the basis of a DfT forecast of what will happen to costs and revenue rather than that of the bidder (DfT, 2006).

Quality enters into the decision as a constraint; bidders are only considered if they are regarded as able to provide the quality of service specified in the contracts. If these standards are not met, franchisees will be penalised and may ultimately lose the franchise. There is an incentive for bidders to offer some inexpensive non-commercial improvements to passenger quality during the bid process in order to gain points that may be decisive in the event of a
close tie on price. In addition, because operators keep some revenue risk, they have a commercial incentive to invest in quality improvements where this will generate a return.

Whoever wins a franchise takes over an existing train operating company (TOC) and its staff and assets, with the exception of senior management, and the salary and conditions of the staff are protected by transfer of employment legislation. This makes for a smooth transition from one operator to another, but puts less competitive pressure on the employees than if the operator has the chance to bring in its own staff.

25 contracts were initially franchised out over the period 1995-7, mainly on 7 year net cost franchises. The Strategic Rail Authority intended to move to longer franchises, but in the event only a few such franchises were let. The current pattern is again seven year franchises, with an option to extend for a further three.

**Germany:** Since 1996, the federal states have been responsible for providing regional rail services which are not commercially viable. Funds are granted from the federal government to subsidise these services. The legal framework leaves high degrees of freedom to PTAs, allowing them to award service contracts by using open tenders, non-open tenders or negotiations, with a growing share of train-km awarded by competitive tendering. DB still dominates regional rail passenger services, with 88% of train km. (DB, 2010).

Franchises are thus handled by 33 regional authorities, and these often franchise their services in several different packages. There is therefore a great variety in the tenders with respect to the size of the area to be served; service contracts have different contractual forms and different degrees of service specification and they vary with respect to contract duration and network size, ranging from single lines up to whole regional network bundles, and between gross and net cost contracts.

Currently, there are more than 120 franchise contracts in operation with duration ranging from 2 to 15 years. Contracts awarded by open tenders appear to have a longer duration (10 years) than those awarded within negotiations (on average 8 years, see Peter 2008). Meanwhile, several PTAs prefer contracts between 10-15 years in order to make them fit with the leasing contracts for new rolling stock for the procured services.

**Sweden:** At the time of writing, the Swedish state-owned operator, SJ AB, still has monopoly control over commercial passenger services although this is due to end shortly. These services account for 56 percent of the market for Swedish rail passenger services. Most non-commercial services are now franchised out, regional services by the respective PTA and interregional by a national body, Rikstrafiken.

As in Germany, non-commercial services comprise both commuter trains in and around major conurbations and rural trains. There is an important capacity difference between regional train services, and commuter trains. Stockholm’s commuter train system is, for instance, decisive for the pattern of time tables also in the rest of the country. Track capacity shortages in that region means that the commuter trains cannot be operated at the desired frequency in peak hours. For rural services, capacity may be available during much of the day.

Contracts are for between three and up to 9 years, and have an option clause for additional years which is typically triggered. Each contract primarily pertains to the operation of a service with the PTA providing rolling stock. Most PTAs have incentive clauses in their contracts with commercial operators, but their relative significance for operator performance...
is uncertain. Gross cost contracts therefore dominate although different incentivising features are gradually being introduced. Nilsson & Jonsson (2011) addresses the problems with analysing the performance of the different types of contracts.

3. CONJECTURES
All three countries have at least formally unbundled their railway industry but differ regarding the institutional separation and the role of the regulator. In both Britain and Sweden the infrastructure manager is a not for profit organisation with charges based on marginal costs (except for the fixed charge in Britain) while access charges in Germany are intended to pay for all infrastructure costs. The overall expectation would be that this – ceteris paribus – would make track user charges higher and demand for rail transport in Germany lower than in the other countries.

In all systems with vertical separation, operators have difficulties in pressing the (monopolist) manager of infrastructure on matters of cost effectiveness. Britain does have a strong regulator to perform that function. In combination with good incentives through the track access charges it is reason to believe that there are appropriate incentives both to train operators and the infrastructure manager to control costs. Sweden lacks any formalised mechanism for controlling cost effectiveness in infrastructure provision while common ownership of both the infrastructure and the dominant operator may supplant the regulatory function in Germany. The expectation would be that this – ceteris paribus – would make costs for infrastructure maintenance highest in Sweden while it is not a priori possible to rank Germany and Britain in this respect.

Train operators outside the DB group are generally in a weak position relative to the infrastructure manager. This would lead us to expect less entry in Germany than in Sweden. The ability to negotiate multi annual track access agreements, and the presence of an effective performance regime combined with complete separation of infrastructure from operations in Britain appear to make this the approach most likely to generate effective competition for the franchises. Since open entry for passenger services was not the purpose of the British model, it is not feasible to rank it against the two other countries in this dimension.

The strong position of the DB group and the regulator’s relatively weak regulatory power provides problems for non-DB operators regarding access to essential facilities and access charging. The DB group is obviously a powerful incumbent with control over the operations of the whole railway system. The intuition is that this will hamper entry and be detrimental for efficiency of the whole system.

4. AGGREGATE PERFORMANCE
The performance of the railway industry in the three countries should be assessed from the perspective of tax payers, of producers and of consumers. It is, however, not possible to single out information which would make it feasible to address directly the conjectures formalised in the previous section. We therefore perform the analysis by way of looking at available data in order to establish what overall picture emerges.

1 Nevertheless, a current study in Britain has recommended giving train operating companies more responsibility for infrastructure costs and decisions through the formation of joint ventures with the infrastructure manager or by their leasing infrastructure on which they are the dominant operator (McNulty, 2011).
Section 4.1 therefore reports about the consequences for taxpayers in the respective countries while section 4.2 and 4.3 account for entry in the passenger and freight markets, respectively. Section 4.4 compares the price level and price growth in the respective countries while section 4.5 summarises information about traffic growth. Section 4.6 concludes.

### 4.1 Taxpayer costs

Taxpayer costs are affected by three activities; the cost effectiveness of infrastructure maintenance and investment activities, the respective governments’ allocation of funds and the ability of service providers to cover their own costs, i.e. the degree of subsidies to non-commercial traffic. It is not possible in practice to identify these items separately; all we can do is to look at the overall level of government spending and get some idea of how much of it comprises investment in infrastructure. Additional problems include the choice of an appropriate exchange rate, and the differences with respect to involvement of the national and regional tiers of government as well as the treatment of spending on infrastructure investment. Table 2 seeks to capture the core aspects of these challenges. It looks at the period from the completion of the reforms in Britain in 1997 to the last year before the onset of recession (2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Britain, m pound, 2005/06 prices</th>
<th>Sweden, m SEK, price level 2005</th>
<th>Germany, m €, price level 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total support to services and infrastructure</td>
<td>Infrastructure renewals and enhancement</td>
<td>Support to infrastructure (net of track user charges) and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2229</td>
<td>1513</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4364</td>
<td>3776</td>
<td>17325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*For Britain numbers refer to fiscal years 1995-96 etc.

In Britain, until 2000-1, track access charges were the main source of revenue to the infrastructure manager and were intended to cover all infrastructure costs. Following the Hatfield accident and the bankruptcy of Railtrack there was a massive rise in spending on
infrastructure, and from 2001-2, two significant changes took place in the way this spending was financed. Firstly, the government introduced direct grants to Network Rail to cover a share of infrastructure costs. Secondly, Network Rail was authorised to borrow to cover a part of infrastructure renewal and enhancement, with the government subsequently reimbursing them for the relevant costs. The result is that published data on the level of support to the rail industry effectively understate support for the early years post 2000-01 and overstate it for the later years. For this period, we have endeavoured to revise the data to show what support would have been if it had simply met the costs of spending in the year in question, by taking Network Rail expenditure, plus support to train operators net of what they pay in track access charges and deducting other Network Rail income (e.g. from property). The result is a series that rises rapidly over the period 2001-2004 (when there was particularly high spending on infrastructure) but falls back to a little less than the 2001 figure by 2007. It should be noted that this is still much higher than at the time of privatisation (Smith, Nash and Wheat, 2009). The second column shows that for the period as a whole this increase in spending is wholly explained by additional infrastructure renewals and enhancement.

For Sweden numbers comprise the financial flow from the national budget to the infrastructure provider, net of revenue from track user charges. This does not include costs for subsidised services and no official figure for this line of spending is available. Moreover, no information which makes it feasible to ex post disentangle regional support for railway services from support for busses is published, the most important reason being that a substantial share of ticket revenue emanates from travel passes which can be used on all modes.

Based on Nilsson and Jonsson (2011), we have, however, estimated PTA’s gross spending on railway services to be about SEK 4 000 million in 2008 and that about half of this cost was covered by subsidies. It is, moreover, assumed that the real costs for taxpayer subsidies has increased by 1.5 percent per year from 1997 to 2007. Even so the bulk of the increase in spending is on infrastructure investment.

The situation in Germany is different from Sweden and England in so far as DB Netz is supposed to cover its costs by way of track access charges. Federal financial support is granted to DB Netz only for capital spending and to Länder for subsidised services. The funds spent by the Länder on behalf of the federal government to pay for non-commercial services include also the payments for track access charges and station charges which are part of the cost calculation in the franchise contracts. Table 2 demonstrates that federal support for subsidised services has risen significantly whilst rail infrastructure investment has stayed approximately constant in real terms. In real terms, the tax payers’ bill has roughly doubled in Britain, it has increased by two thirds in Sweden while the increase has been 42 percent in Germany. In addition, table 3, which is based on the numbers for 2007 in table 2, has been compiled in order to normalise the comparison of taxpayer costs in different ways.

Three different comparisons are made. First, costs to taxpayers are divided by total train kilometres (table 1), as infrastructure subsidies benefit both commercial and non-commercial operations as well as freight services. Moreover, also commercial services are franchised in Britain. The second comparison is with respect to the number of 2007 inhabitants, being 60.1, 9.1 and 82.31 million for Britain, Sweden and Germany, respectively. The third comparison is with respect to costs per passenger km. Although support for infrastructure also benefits freight traffic, Britain’s lower degree of freight traffic than Sweden and Germany may mean that this measure unduly favours Britain.
The table indicates that irrespective of which comparison is made, Sweden’s taxpayers pay most for the country’s infrastructure. It is not possible to establish whether the differences provide indications of the relative cost efficiency, geography or differences in political priorities, although it is notable that Britain spends a lot less per inhabitant than either of the other two countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support (m)</th>
<th>€, m</th>
<th>€/train km</th>
<th>€/pass km</th>
<th>€/inhabitant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain, £</td>
<td>4364</td>
<td>5134*</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden, SEK**</td>
<td>17 325</td>
<td>1 898***</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, €</td>
<td>9 888</td>
<td>9 888</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Comparisons of tax support in 2007 to the railway industry in the three countries. 2005 prices, million.
* £.85/€1
** The denominator refers to all railway traffic in the respective countries, not only to franchises.
*** SEK9.13/€1

4.2 Competition in passenger services

Eleven companies operating 20 franchises ranging in length from 6 to 25 years are currently active in Britain (table 3). Due to the size of each franchise, there is little scope for small companies to participate. British operators dominate, many of which originated in the bus industry, although several government owned foreign railways are also active. Companies often bid together, though the pairing changes over time. With only one or two exceptions there has always been enough interest for DfT to shortlist at least three bidders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>7 private, 4 public</td>
<td>4 rail, 7 other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>21 private, 38 public</td>
<td>55 rail, 4 other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2 private, 7 public</td>
<td>9 rail</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Operators in Britain, Germany and Sweden.

Limited open access competition is permitted on the basis that it must demonstrate to the regulator that it is in the public interest and not primarily abstracting revenue from franchisees. At the time of writing, only two open access competitors exist, operating a handful of trains on the East Coast Main Line.

The German regional market is characterised by a large number of operators, even though DB’s subsidiary for regional services continues to dominate. But while 59 companies are active, several are characterised by joint ownerships or are subsidiaries of some large companies. The number of active bidders is therefore smaller than the figures indicated in table 3. There seems to have been substantial competition with a range of bids received per tender of between one and eight (see Beck 2010) whenever contracts have been let competitively. The operation of long distance services is in principle subject to open access competition in Germany, but DB still operates 99% of these trains.
There is yet no competition in Sweden’s market for commercial services. A couple of tenders for non-commercial services have received only two bids, but in particular for the larger contracts four and more bids have been submitted in the final bidding round.

SJ AB submits bids for non-commercial train services and remains the dominant operator also in this part of the market even though it has not submitted bids for recent tenders. As in Germany, joint ownership makes it difficult to establish the number of active contestants. Behind the 9 firms indicated in table 3 it can be estimated that at least six owners are active. SJ AB is by far the largest. The Danish and Norwegian government-owned incumbents as well as the private operators FirstGroup, Arriva and Veolia all have a toehold on the market; recently, a DB subsidiary has also won contracts. Even though SJ AB dominates, and though other bidders predominantly are large national parastatals or private groups, it seems to be fair to say that the competitive pressure is substantial.

To summarise, there is as yet very little experience of open access competition in passenger transport in the three countries. Although it has been permitted since 1994 in Germany, the incumbent still holds a dominant position. The three countries make use of competitive tendering. Britain’s model has this as its defining feature; in Sweden competition for non-commercial contracts is extensive, while Germany makes the least use of franchising. It is obvious that there has been competition when contracts have been let in all three countries. The incumbent still dominates also non-commercial services in Germany and holds a strong while less dominant position in Sweden.

4.3 Competition in freight services

In Britain, along with the introduction of open access in freight services, the existing state owned freight operator was dismembered and sold as a number of separate companies. In practice, ownership passed to just two organisations, one (EWS) specialising in bulk commodities and the other (Freightliner) in containers. However, both have now entered each other’s markets, and thus this deliberate restructuring has led Britain to have the lowest market share of the dominant operator. Several smaller entrants have also come into the market, although few have survived, and of these the largest two are GB Railfreight, which is now owned by Eurotunnel, whilst Direct Rail services is a subsidiary of a public sector company in the nuclear industry. Despite the small number of companies, the largest operator in Britain (now DB Schenker) is much less dominant than in Sweden or Germany (Table 4), and the general impression is that competition is effective in reducing charges and improving quality of freight services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid licences</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market share; incumbent</td>
<td>78% DB Schenker</td>
<td>76% Green Cargo</td>
<td>56% DB Schenker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market share; other major operator</td>
<td>Cargo Net 7.5% Malmtrafik 7%</td>
<td>34% Freightliner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: The freight market in 2008. Source: European Commission Rail Market Monitoring Study. COM 2009 676Final/2, except market share data for Sweden which is ?

Although the German market was completely opened in 1994, and there are a large number of individual operators, many are small, running their services over their own infrastructure and
do not directly compete with the incumbent. In 2009, almost 60 rail companies competed directly with the incumbent (see Mofair, 2009), but the number of non-DB operators varies within the types of freight transport. There is competition for some bulk and container services (for example, 23 companies are active in the container market) but DB still holds a large share of that market also.

The market for freight services in Sweden was opened up for entry in 1998. In 2001 Green Cargo AB was separated from the SJ umbrella. There are therefore no formal links between SJ AB and Green Cargo, although both are state owned. Malmtrafik is a subsidiary of the mining company LKAB with the single task of transporting iron ore from the Lapland mines to ports and steel mills in Norway and Sweden, and the Norwegian-owned CargoNet operates container trains. Several entrants started off operating feeder trains to Green Cargo. The trend is, however, that this hegemony is slowly eaten away. Moreover, there is also a turnover of operators with 31 firms having been started during the period, whereof 15 are still active. This indicates that it is indeed feasible to enter the business and that the incumbents’ position is being challenged.

To summarise, there is obviously much more nominal than real competition in the freight market in all three countries. The German and Swedish incumbents still hold a strong position in their respective markets although the dominance at least in Sweden is slowly being reduced. Entry is obviously feasible. The much lower degree of market dominance by the leading British operators might lead to an expectation that competition is more effective there than in Sweden or Germany.

4.4 Prices

Freight contracts are not publicised and price levels in freight can therefore not be compared. Table 5 shows passenger fares per km in eurocents, and demonstrates Sweden’s regional fares to be high compared to the peers. Germany’s long-distance travellers seem to get away with slightly cheaper fares than Sweden’s and Britain’s. Even if Sweden’s currency currently is 10-15 percent stronger than the average for the recent years, the numbers for Sweden are notable not least in view of the fact that tax support has been demonstrated to be very high. Germany has the lowest fares both in regional and long distance markets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Long distance</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>London</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain1)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1) Figures refer to all rail companies. 2) Figures for long-distance refer to the incumbent (SJ/DB), figures for regional services refer to all operators.

Table 6 summarises the price increases during the period since the rail reform. In all three countries, rail fares have risen faster than prices in general. In Britain the fastest growth was in long distance fares but in Germany and Sweden in short distance. Germany has experienced the highest price increase in the transport sector relative to general inflation but is the only country where petrol prices grew faster than the prices for rail and domestic air.
Table 6: Average annual price increases, percent. Sources: Sweden - Official data over CPI available at www.scb.se, petrol price at Bil Sweden (2008); Britain: Transport Statistics Great Britain (DfT) except for rail fares which are from National Rail Trends. Germany; Transport in Figures (BMVBW/DIW).

4.5 Traffic growth
Table 7 shows substantial passenger traffic growth for Britain for the period post privatisation, with the fastest growth in the London commuter market and the slowest for regional services. Between 1997 and 2007, rail passenger traffic has grown around 3.5, whereas car traffic has grown at less than 1 percent per annum (Transport Statistics Great Britain 2009). This growth cannot be attributed wholly or even mainly to rail reform – other factors including the state of the economy and the cost and journey times for motoring are more important (Wardman, 2006).

Table 7: Average annual traffic growth, percent. Sources: Sweden – Road and rail data available at www.trafa.se . Germany: Transport in Figures (BMVBW/DIW. Britain Transport Statistics Great Britain (Car), National Rail Trends (rail) HM Treasury (GDP)

In 1985, regional services accounted for 26 percent of total rail traffic in Sweden. Table 7 shows that subsequent growth primarily has been in regional traffic, one consequence being that these services now account for 42 percent of all passenger km. While not shown in the table, growth has been higher after 1990, which is a couple of years after the 1988 separation and about at the same time as the first services were being franchised. During the same period, growth in car traffic – measured in terms of vehicle km – has been clearly below rail sector growth. GDP has increased faster than road and long distance rail traffic while the increase in regional trips has been substantially higher.
The use of Germany’s regional rail services grew faster than car traffic between 1996 and 2007; during the same period passenger-km in long-distance rail services stayed approximately constant. The increase of regional trips should be seen in the light of an increase of public subsidies which led to an increased supply of regional trains. On the other hand this is also a result of better targeting services to regional needs through the regionalisation approach (for a discussion see Link and Merkert 2011).

Despite increases in real fares, all three countries have thus seen persistent traffic growth, in particular on their respective regional and commuter lines. Fares in Sweden seem to be high, in spite of substantial government support to the industry. Revenue from the operators’ track user charges account for only 10 percent of annual costs for maintaining and operating the infrastructure.

Turning to the freight sector, traffic has grown in all three countries, though fastest (from a low base) in Britain; cf. table 8. Again, the growth cannot simply be ascribed to privatisation; other factors (such as the growth in the burning of imported coal in power stations in Britain, leading to long hauls from the ports) are important.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freight tonne km 1995</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freight tonne km 2007</td>
<td>19.39</td>
<td>70.50</td>
<td>13.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage growth</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 Rail freight traffic, 1995-2007 (thousand million tonne km). Source: EU Energy and Transport in Figures 2009

4.6 Observations
In both Britain and Sweden public financial support for the rail industry has grown enormously, particularly in terms of spending on infrastructure renewal and enhancement. Public support has grown significantly less in Germany, but the growth there has been has been mainly in subsidies rather than investment. Sweden has much higher levels of public support than Britain and Germany, which may reflect differing geography (lower population density) and greater government priority given to rail. All countries have seen impressive traffic growth although Britain has seen the fastest.

5. CONCLUSIONS
The last 20 years have seen the railway industry in Sweden, Britain and Germany undergo profound change. At the core of the transformation is vertical separation of infrastructure from operations. The three countries however differ with respect to the nature of market opening. Britain’s approach is based on competitive tendering of all passenger services. Sweden has had a monopoly franchise for commercial passenger operations while the 40-plus percent of the passenger market which is partly financed by subsidies is being competitively tendered. The market for freight services was formally opened for entry in 1998, but Sweden and Germany still have the incumbent in a strong position. Many of Germany’s regional services are franchised, but only a few of them on a competitive basis and DB remains dominant in this market too. The countries also differ with respect to the actual degree of separation with Germany retaining very strong organisational links between infrastructure and
the incumbent – although still fulfilling the EU requirements for separation\(^2\) – while Sweden’s and Britain’s infrastructure provider is completely separate from train operators.

From a textbook perspective, it is reasonable to expect that Britain’s comprehensive introduction of competition through franchising in the passenger sector, lack of a state owned dominant operator in the freight sector, complete separation of infrastructure from operations, systematic use of economic incentives and a strong regulator should have imposed greater efficiency on the British rail system. Sweden has not achieved the same degree of competition in the commercial passenger and freight markets, and makes less use of economic incentives. The strength of the Germany incumbent would lead us to expect least improvement there.

In practice, we find that Germany has the slowest growth in public financial support for its railway as well as the lowest fares and substantial traffic growth except in the long distance passenger market. Both Britain and Sweden have had faster growth in public financial support than Germany, although this has mainly been in infrastructure renewal and enhancement, and there has been debate as to the adequacy of current infrastructure spending in Germany. On most measures, Britain has lower absolute levels of financial support than Germany, as well as faster traffic growth. Sweden clearly has much higher financial support, although this may be the result of low population density. Thus on balance it is not clear that the reform process has worked better in the other countries than in Germany, despite initial expectations. Further in depth research on the reasons for these changes in financial support and traffic levels would be needed to reach a more conclusive answer.

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\(^2\) At the time of writing, the European Commission is however investigating the problem of financial flows (profit-loss transfers) between the infrastructure provider DB Netz and the DB transport companies as part of the legal action against 13 member states failing to fully implement the first railway package (see European Commission 2010).
Bundesnetzagentur (2009b)

Bundesnetzagentur (2010a)


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